'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎64v] (133/294)

The following is an analysis of the employment of tanks on the
various duties described above* Action witn tne enemy resulted in
about 10/a of the tank "sorties".
Type of operation
No. of
occasions
Total
T^nkjaies
Reconnaissance, demonstrations of
force, and moving station
75
9,840
Searches and drives with other arms
31
4,128
Patrols without other arms
In Jewish colonies
83
5,079
On roads and tracks
77
5,348
Protecting railways
63
3,314
Protecting power lines
71
3,219
Acting with other arms in striking
forces, escorts and mixed patrols
72
3,778
Curfew patrols, test runs and miscellaneous
-
3,931
TOTALS
472
38,637
It will be seen from this analysis that there were few occasions
when tanks were employed in their true war roles, either for fighting
or^for reconnaissance; and only too often they had to be takenVor
duties better suited to armoured cars had more been available,
ihe principal reason for this lay in the disinclination of the enemy
0 . ®y ve security oi his rugged hills excejjt sometimes at night,
11103 ^ ^ i0 en S a S eme nts took place on ground unsuited to the
action of any A.F.V. ^ in consequence tanks seldom had any chance of
manoeuviing round t.neir enemy and dealing with him in the open country,
x-ou^x neir presence at the foot of the hills remained a constant
4 -v °t' r* 1 ° ^ helped oo free the railways and Jewish colonies lying on
pn ca ^ S r °f l "5' ne luenace oi sudden attack. On the Yhiole the lessons
thpr'p sno ' / “ 1=13 .may be seen from the list quoted above - that
even thnn^ u3es for tanics in this type of operations,
of their hf , ir ^ Uir ‘ st ^ nce3 deprive them of making full use of many
presence c f ract f 13tic s. .There is no doubt at all that the
proved a v-luU 1 t G °mpany in Palestine was amply justified and
=-
APhOppED CAPR
was available, o^whioJonePlb ‘‘ 0yal Air Poroe armoured cars (No. 2)
Trans-Jordan. It was reinfo-cePa f ° r ^ Wh ° le peri ° d “ -
No. 1 Company from Iran - a 2 x 061 a few v/eeks ^7 two sections oi
from Cairo. Demands ° f ^ the llth HuSSarS
heavy, and there were -nlrW 1 lce s oi armoured cars were always
operations to 2° round. It is probable that
** 3 IvA UilwJl t. vvPr'P o o ^ w V^C-CX o i«w x v i
similar operations under cond^tf^ 1 ^ g ° round * It is probable thai
sa me effect, and where sufficient^ 01 re ^ ellion wil1 always have the
normally be necessary to re^nw- - ^•r j ‘ l0urecl cars are not at hand it mil
j u resort to improvisation.
44816-1