'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎58r] (120/294)

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GUNS -AND AiavIUNITION
Dragon-drawn 4.5-in. and 3.7-in. Howitzers were both employed in
Palestine, but to such a limited extent that the efficiency of the equip
ments for the task in hand was never really put to the test. For the
most part the infantry mortar, being far more easily transported on hill
tracks, filled the normal role of the field artillery. There was little
demand for smoke and normally H. E. only was carried in the field.
Other guns in use were the naval 2-pr. pom-pom and the 3-pr. Q F
mounted in either lorries or railway trucks, and both gave good service.
The pom-pom fired 200 rounds per minute against the 20 rounds per minute
of the 3-pr., thus producing enough fire power to enable a wide area to be
"searched” in a very short time. The moral effect of this high rate of
fire was very great, and it was particularly valuable at night. On the
other hand the pom-pom required expert maintenance and constant attention
while the 3—pr, had only four "working parts and was easy to maintain. In
addition the life of the pom-pom was 5000 rounds - and a good deal less
if high rates of fire were continued - so that considerable economy had
to be exercised in ios Uoe. The pom-pom fired either a time-fuzed powder-
filled (C.N.F.) shell or an inpact-fuzed H.E. shell, while the 3-pn was
supplied with similar shells though both were impact fuzed. There "was a
certain risk of prematures with the time-fuzed C.N.F. shell which made it
dangerous to fire over troops and necessitated a minimum fuze-setting of
1000 yards. On the whole the impact-fuzed H.E. shell proved preferable
owing to its greater destructive power in rocky country, the easier ob
servation of its bursts, and the elimination of fuze-setting.
MORTARS AND AMMUNITION
The infantry mortar proved extremely valuable and was undoubtedly
one of the successes of the operations. Its ease of transportation, its
high moral effect - especially when used in conjunction with machine guns
- and its remarkable accuracy made it an excellent v/eapon. Furthermore
its simplicity enabled detachments to be trained very rapidly, an import
ant point in Palestine where few battalions had ever seen a mortar before.
It was never in action during wet weather, so that the effects of damp
ground and atmosphere were never gauged. On rocky ground, where the base
plate cannot be well dug in and where the spikes are easily damaged, some
difficulties were encountered at the longer ranges since the base plate
was inclined to slip back and make extensive adjustments necessary after
each round. To counteract this some sandbags are desirable, but in
their absence small pieces of rock should be packed under the base plate
to act as a cushion.
For transit by U T. a wooden frame to carry the mortar and its com
ponents in one load which can be readily lifted by four men not only
facilitates coming into action quickly but is also necessary to prevent
damage in transit. This must not of course be confused with the fixed
mounting described in Appendix X which is for a mortar intended to fire
from the truck. Some night-firing equipment was found to be needed, and
the spare parts bag proved to be inadequate: the webbing of the latter
was too easily torn after a few weeks’ hard wear, and a leather bag would
have been preferable. On several occasions the mortar was manhandled
cross-country for distances up to fifteen kilometers, and it was found
that the detachments were able to keep up with rifle companies over any
type of country. The loads are, however, heavy and likely to lead to
exhaustion on a hot day: for this reason donkeys were used wherever pos
sible and detachments were always double-banked for carries of over one
kilometre.
About 5 % of the bombs fired failed to explode, due, so far as could
Ue ascertained, either to defective ammunition or to the bomb landing on
its side. Remains of some exploded bombs showed that about one third