'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎51r] (106/294)

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the most part through deep winding gorges above which were steep
inaccessible hills with villages well beyond the reach of M.T. In such
country the railway was clearly the quickest means of getting troops
to the required spot, mid on one occasion when a drive of the area took
place a cordon was quickly established by running a special train down
the line from which detachments were dropped at suitable points en
route.
For the moves of reinforcements and supplies the Lyuda-Kan tara
line (301 kms) bore the brunt of the traffic. It had many drawbacks:
it was single track throughout and there was a shortage of rolling stock -
particularly flats - on the Palestine side, so that Egyptian stock had
to be moved to and fro by the tedious process of ferrying across the Suez
Canal. Furthermore the danger of accidents from sabotage was always
considerable and no night running was possible in Palestine. An
example of the difficulties of rail movements is afforded by the train
which brought up a company of tanks ■which formed one of the first rein
forcements. The train left Cairo at 9 p.m. on May 9th and did not
reach Haifa until 7.45 a.m. on the 11th, a journey which in normal times
is completed in 15 hours.
The deficiencies of the only other route - the Sinai road - served
to throv/ an added strain upon the railv/ay. The road was liable to
sudden interruption by weather and was never intended to take heavier
traffic than a few tourists 1 motor cars daily. To avoid serious
damage it was therefore necessary to send heavy lorries and the armoured
cars of the 11th Hussars by train, while small columns of lighter vehicles
which could have come by road were often too vulnerable to move on the
long stretch between the Egyptian frontier and Jerusalem without special
protective measures. Consequently they too travelled mostly by train.
However with all its drawbacks the railway managed successfully to
provide almost the only line of communication to the outside world from
April to September, when the Base was changed from Egypt to Haifa.
THE AIAIN TRANSP O RT LESSONS
The chief lesson which emerged was the value of light fast motor
transport, combined with motor-borne pack donkeys, to give the troops
an all-round superiority in mobility over their lightly equipped native
opponents.
The importance of pack animals to enable columns to get off the
roads and subsist without lines of communication was clearly shown.
The superiority of the donkey for this purpose proved once again tna
the animal most v/idely used by the inhabitants is usually the be^t or
military purposes.
The employment of hired M.T. proved a very successful substitute
for a large fleet of service vehicles, and 'will probably a wayo e oO
in organized countries possessing a network of good main roa s. ^
this connection a little nursing of the civilian drivers y e
units to which they are attached will amply repay in reau s.
Finally it is the mental and physical mobility o e r0 °^
themselves which wins in the end: no transport faci i les can rtq
it, and the more motor transport is employed the more icu i
to maintain the required standard.