'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎49v] (103/294)

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Col'jmn Commanders
Big columns often included parties of all three Services and in
such cases the command was vested in the senior officer irrespective of
the Service to v/hich he might happen to helcng: this sometimes produced
anomalies in seniority, hut in the end gave unquestionably the best
results. Before starting it was always essential for a plan to be
drawn up and communicated to all officers not only as to the action to
be taken on meeting enemy opposition but also as to the policy regarding
abandonment of stranded vehicles.
Crouping of vehicles
It was found that a group of 20 vehicles was about as much as one
officer could conveniently manage and columns were grouped accordingly
vehicles being sorted out to make each group as homogenious as possible.
It was best to eliminate the slower 5-tonners altogether if possible
and run them as a separate column. The grouping system could seldom
be applied properly to civilian convoys, the speed of which became of
necessity that of the slowest vehicle.
Distances between vehicles
Since there was little congestion on the roads and most of the
columns were comparatively small, the question of taking up road space
was of little importance: the twisting hilly nature of the roads and
the special tactical conditions were the chief considerations and led to
a much more open spacing than would have been necessary in Buropean
warfare. When travelling at 20 m.p.h. a distance of 400 yds between
vehicles gives a driver no more than 40 seconds to pull up in an
emergency, which was found to be none too much to keep him well clear
of any traps^into which the leading vehicle might fall, particularly
when descending steep hills. 400 yards was therefore set as the
distance between vehicles in small columns of half a dozen or less.
Larger columns were run with at least 50 yards between vehicles and 400
yards between every fifth one. At night the space between individual
vehicles was opened out to 100 yds. It was found that drivers needed
considerable practice to keep these increased distances, and at first
had usually a vepy vague idea what 400 yards distance looked like; but
once usod uo^it it helped to speed up movement and minimise the effects
o .nuny action. ihe fact that the enemy seldom could see the total
^ngth of a column ao any one time made him cautious and was sometimes
the means of letting a single vehicle pass unscathed through an ambush:
it also made it more difficult for him to follow a favourite practice
° off the last vehicle on a road whore it was impossible
vehlcles in front-to turn round. With civilian convoys the
0 ^° 9n a ^- C ? U ld ^P 6 ^ ^ or was to keep 400 yards between the groups
Speed
^ Columns without 3-ton vehicles averaged about 20-25 m.p.h. on the
Llf® ??? i5 “ 17 ln th3 hills, while speed at night was from 10-12 m.p.h.
« , lv ^ oonv °.y~» ■ -- v/ibn their h^avy vehicles, were surprisingly
00 y°y i- lme 7 ta hles were worked out on a basis of 20 m.p.h.
^ 0 - 1 ' ■ - T ' - a margin added for involuntary stoppages.
Stoppages
y r3 e a J; din g involuntary stoppages had naturally to vary
all ennr-m y 3 "™ 3 '■ 1 * 1003 > the essentials being a plan communicated to
col,.^ arlBS ° r r ^ d a system of signals to prevent the
CD It was not sufficient to rely upon drivers
. .tching the vehicles behind them through their driving mirrors.