'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎48r] (100/294)

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The Jevrs proved to he better drivers on the whole than the Arabs
and were more reliable. The better ones were excellent and there were
many notable cases of coolness and bravery under fire among these men:
the poorer ones at times showed a tendency to abandon their vehicles too
soon when fired at, but it was only necessary to report a man to the
Jewish Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. to secure his instant replacement. Vehicles too which
broke down were always replaced at once and no repair organization,
beyond first aid, was therefore necessary.
Civilian drivers were unarmed, but were issued ■'with steel helmets,
field dressings, blankets and rations. It was found that they usually
acquired something approaching a khaki uniform - sometimes of striking
originality. For the most part the Jewish drivers gave cheerful, keen
and loyal service and their value was usually in proportion to the
interest shown in them by the units to which they were attached. Care
was necessary to give them reasonable protection in Arab areas and, in
addition to accommodating the drivers inside the camps, an armed soldier
had always to accompany each vehicle. For the rest the inevitable
friendliness of the British soldier did much to get the best out of the
Jew who drove his transport.
On the whole the hired transport gave good service, though naturally
neither the discipline of the drivers nor the mechanical efficiency of
the vehicles were up to military standard. Vehicle equipments usually
needed augmenting for military purposes, but otherwise little alteration
was necessary. Contrary to the recommendations of " Imperial Policing
1954 " it was seldom found necessary to remove windscreens or to fit wire
netting. Armour was tried in certain special vehicles which were employed
on duties likely to draw more fire than usual, and was useful around
the cab and lower part of the windscreen to give confidence to civilian
drivers. Sandbag protection to the bodies was found to be too heavy
and affected steering on twisting mountain roads. Wire-netting was
fitted to a few W.D. vehicles for special employment in town riots,
but had the grave dravAiack of preventing troops from dismounting rapidly,
for this reason it could never be used outside towns and was n^ver
regarded with much favour even for riot purposes.
Types of hired vehicles
Hired cars were mostly good high-powered American saloons of the
Ford V8 quality. They were roomy and fast with a good cross-country
capacity, but suffered again from the drawback of being difficult uo
get out of in a hurry. Open tourers would have been infinitely better,
but unfortunately none were to be had. It was also difficult for
aircraft to distinguish these hired saloons, and devices were tried
such as whitewashing roofs etc. In the early stages eacn motorise
infantry company had sufficient cars to lift one platoon, which could
either act as advanced guard to a bus or lorry column or could speed
on ahead of the remainder to a point where reinforcements were urgently
awaited. Later, as more troops became available, this small margin of
extra speed was seldom required and far more necessary was an ability
to get into action immediately on coming under fire. From this point
cars were used mostly for communication purposes or to carry commanders
and staff officers.
Buses were of the single deck type, fast, and with a surprising
cross-country performance: they were readily available in largo o:rs
and provided a degree of shelter and comfort for troops unobtainable
in other vehicles. They were however veritable death traps m areas
where they were likely to come under sudden fire, and their use had to
be restricted to non-tactical moves. In some cases_the tops were removed
and this converted them into good troop-carrying vehicles, u o er
wise they were far too difficult to get out of in an emergency.