'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎37r] (78/294)

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Finally, in countries where maps are produced locally it will
usually be found that they are more up to date than those obtainable
elsewhere: moreover the use of two different grids may occur. In such
cases local purchase Yd.ll usually be the best source of supply.
SECURITY
The Problem of preventing information reaching the enemy
In the absence of Martial Lav/- this problem presented the* very greatest
difficulty, and it is not unfair to say that the failure to impose
Martial Law resulted in needless casualties to troops owing to leakage
of information. Failing Martial Law, the following were found to be
useful rules for obtaining a measure of secrecy
(a) Vi/herever possible plan and execute an operation in the same
24 hours.
(b) Where the civil authorities and police have to be informed
regarding intending operations, inform them last of all.
(c) Tell outside helpers, such as interpreters and police guides,
nothing beyond the time and place of rendezvous until the operation
has actually started.
(d) Never refer to an impending operation over the telephone, even
in what you may imagine are well disguised terms.
(e) Remember that every movement of your M.T. is going to be
reported to the enemy.
Causes of Leakage
There was nothing new in the way in which information regarding
plans reached the enemy: it was only intensified in Palestine by the
necessity for telling everything to three separate organisations e
troops, the police, and the civil authorities - and the fact that the
offices of the latter two contained a preponderance of Arabs. Care
lessness was usually the cause, and from this the forces themselves
cannot be excused. Unguarded telephone conversations, discussion ot
operations in public places, and carelessness in handling secret ^ocu-
ments in offices all helped to contribute. The local labour of t -e
N.A.A.F.I. was a particular danger. The Manager was often warne Y
units of impending moves in order either to cancel orders a re a y p a
or to obtain other goods, and the news would leak out through emp oy .
The state of semi-war-semi-peace in which units worked made this danger
greater than it would normally be under war conditions, and ^ ^ s ° ~
times necessary for units to be reminded that casual ieo Co.us y
of secrecy are a poor exchange for good canteen arrangements or
saving of money. One of the special tasks of unit in ^ e lgenw -U •
should be to ensure that forthcoming operations are not discussed m
Institutes.
Information regarding the movement of troops was ^ transmitted by
inhabitants, who watched camps and roads and sent their messages by
means of lights in houses, bonfires, and ^ke ^©aals
Martial Law the only legal action which could be taken to combat th^
extensive enemy signal organization was to arres an ^ ^ -nl ainlv very
police any person caught in flagrante delicto. Ln although
difficult to do, and mere difficult still to prove afterwards , a!though e
no one abroad by night in Palestine in 1936 could have faile