'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎35v] (75/294)

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"but they did not v/ant too much to read, far less too much to write, in
the shape of reports and returns. For this reason it was necessary to
keep under constant review the issue of routine intelligence documents,
Their value depended chiefly on the speed with which they could be
distributed, and this was usually the deciding iactor as to whether the
issue of a particular document should be continued.
In Palestine it was usual for all headquarters, from Force H.Q. to
battalion H.Q., to issue a daily narrative of events. These were
usually distributed during the afternoon and contained information
received up to 0800 hrs. In addition Force H.Q. and some lower head
quarters, produced a weekly Intelligence Summary which included political
information, forecasts of likely developments, press extracts etc., as
well as a resume of the operations of the past v/eek and also "Special
points of military interest". Farce H.Q. also issued at regular inter
vals statistical detail on such subjects as ammunition expended, casual
ties to both sides, arms captured, numbers of vehicles convoyed, and
many others. All of this produced a mass of data for record purposes,
but undoubtedly at times resulted in the expenditure of more energy than
perhaps was justified by the immediate requirements. As a consequence
of these experiences it is thought that in future the procedure listed
below should suffice to reconcile too much paper-work with too little
exchange of information.
In Units and R.A.F. Stations:
One daily intelligence report in message form is essential,
covering the previous twenty-four hours. In addition a written
summary is required twice a week.
In Brigade s:
One daily report in message form is necessary. This will
usually be despatched first thing in the morning and compiled from
unit reports which have arrived during the night. It should be
followed by a daily written narrative, prepared during the morning
and despatched in the afternoon. '| ■
In Divisions:
Corps will of course require a daily narrative from Divisions,
but whether this should also be sent to Brigades will depend upon
communications. If a Corps daily narrative can be distributed
tnroughout the area of operations in one day, then it will probably
be sufficient for Divisions to issue only a v/eekly summary. Where
this is not possible, Divisions should distribute a narrative daily
to Brigades and to each other.
Force H. Q.
A weekly intelligence summary will invariably be required, and
should be issued in sufficient quantity to allow of distribution
down to unit and R.A.F. Station headquarters. If Divisions issue
daily narratives it is probably unnecessary for Force H.Q. to do so
ve Hj and the narratives can be incorporated in a weekly or
bi-weekly summary. If Divisions do not issue daily narratives,
then Force H.Q. should do so. So
So far as statistics are concerned there was a tendency to throw
unneceooary work on intelligence officers by demanding a higher degree
of accuracy than was required and sometimes by asking them for informa
tion which was already available elsewhere. Statistics are undoubtedly
useful for staff officers^and may be of general interest to the troops,
but as a rule only approximate figures are wanted for this purpose.
In any case many can be extracted from the normal administrative returns,