'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎30r] (64/294)

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The Corps H.Q. establishment proved to be short of personnel in
more than one direction: no provision was made for a Central Registry
and the clerical staff was totally insufficient for conducting operations
on the basis of peace-time accounting. As regards the former, one
officer clerk and sufficient other rank clerks to staff a central registry
were immediately required, and help from Egypt had. to be invoked to
procure them. Reference is made later on to the difficulties of continu
ing peace accounting on active service: if this is to be done a Corps
H.Q. needs to be augmented with staffs to deal with such matters as
contracts, cost accounting and elaborate supply accounts, since the
War Establishment is sufficient only to handle such things on a war
time footing. This applies especially to R.A.P.C. Staff, who were
incidentally in dire need of typewriters to do their monthly pay accounts
and were not consoled when the first instalment of baggage proved to be
six out-size ice chests l In spite of this the H.Q. brought with it a
number of advisers and experts, and one consequence of their arrival
was a veiy noticeable increase in paper-work throughout the whole
garrison. Previously force of circumstances had kept this to a minimum
without, it must be confessed, any apparent loss of efficiency. British
Army staffs are appreciably larger than those of some other European
armies: it is inevitable that the larger the staff the greater will be
the paper-work inflicted upon the troops in the field, and it is worthy
of consideration whether efficiency increases enough to provide justifica
tion. Much of the work may be traced to attempts to secure economy,
but sometimes it may be questionable whether in the end the method
employed does not defeat its own object.
Staffs of Lower Formations
With the exception of the Brigade H.Q. already referred to, most
of the lower formations arrived in Palestine with their H.Q. staffs
complete. Sven so a certain amount of improvisation became necessary:
staffs had to be found for formations such as Base Area, L. of C. Area
etc., while casualties had to be replaced locally as a rule. The
difficulty of finding suitable officers to fill these posts was very
marked, and it was fortunate that a supply was^close at hand in Egypt.
In the type of operations then in progress, which often involved the^
widest dispersion of small detachments, there were seldom enough regi
mental officers to go round and to withdraw any more for staff duties
would have handicapped seriously most of the battalions. Particular
difficulty was experienced in finding trained Intelligence Officers,
and even those who held mobilization appointments in the Emergency Force
often had had little practical experience of intelligence work. It
was found that attendance at a course of instruction alone is not
sufficient to qualify an officer for intelligence duties at a Brigade
H.Q. or higher without practical experience at exercises and manoeuvres.
A deficiency in other ranks was experienced in some Headquarters
Establishments, and resulted in a further drain upon the fighting
This ao-ain was a serious thing for most units: many were already far
below their proper establishment, some had left large rear parties at
their previous stations, and as a rule the paper strength of a unit was
no real indication of its effective strength in the field where man
power rather than fire-power was invariably_required. To quote instances,
it was found necessary to implement a Divisional Headquarters with the
following:-
2 N.C.O’s and 4 typists for "G-" and "AQ" Staff.
Clerks for D.A.P.M. and Camp Commandant - also typewriters and
office equipment.
An N.C.O. to understudy and assist the C.Q.M.S.
A caterer and cook for the Serjeants’ Mess.