'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎29r] (62/294)

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The final requirement, the prevision of a general reserve, was at
first met by retaining one highly-mobile unit among the H.Q. troops.^
This role was filled for the most part by the 2nd Bn., The Bedfordshire
and Hertfordshire Regiment, carried in the Ford V 8 trucks of the R»A. x'.
Lifting Company, and also at times by the 3th Hussars. But die^major
commitment of the reserve - revolt in Trans-Jordan - never materialised,
and it was in fact employed mostly to reinforce the military areas in
Palestine. On such occasions it was necessary to place it temporarily
under the area commander, with the result that the unit was constantly
changing command. The arrival of the Emergency Force from England an
September made it possible to allot sufficient troops to areas oo
provide each with an adequate local reserve, and no infantry or cavalry
units were any longer retained as H.Q. troops. The Trans-Jordan commit
ment was met by earmarking a Brigade of the Southern /irea x or this
possible task. This enabled the Area Commander to employ the Brigade
on suitable tasks which did not involve a wide dispersion, and at the
same time gave the Brigade itself a chance to carry out its reconnais
sances and make necessary preparations. This is probably e me
of providing for a general reserve under similar conditions, though m
Palestine it was never actually put to the ultimate test.
THE STAFF
Force Headquarters
At the besannincr of the rebellion the Air Officer Commanding
exercised command tM a staff of some It R.A.F. officers divided
among branches dealing with "Operations", "Irio 'lligence 3 rganiza ion
and Training", "Signals", "Personnel", "Stores", and "Engineering .
In addition there was a civilian staff for Works and Buildings and for
cipher duties. Air H.Q. was accommodated in a_ former hotel building
in Jerusalem where it had been installed some five years earlier.
The Officer Commanding British Troops in Palestine (Colonel J.F.
Evetts, M.C. ) had his Headquarters in the same building as Air h.Q.
It was however organized quite independently as a fomation .^.
immediately suboniinate to Air H.Q., and it was the custom for the two
to correspond by letters and signal messages m the normal manner. It
wL not i economical method and inevitably resulted in a certain amount
of duplication and unnecessary staff work. It had prooably arisen irom
the fact that no commander of the British Troops m Palestine had been
atraointed prior to 1932, and command had been exercised, without a staff
officer ' by the senior Lieutenant-Colonel of the two infantry battalions.
1936 the staff of the O.C. British Troops consisted of a Brigade
Major and an acting Staff Captain, who was a regimental officer of ah.
battalion stationed in Jerusalem.
Such were the staff arrangements which continued until the 7th.
June when they became no longer workable. Their effect was to tnrou
upon’th^ smeller staff an overwhelming share of the work involved. In
the stive of "duties in aid of the civil power" in its true sense it is
inevitable that most of the work will fall to troops rather than to
aircraft and until the armed bands started to appear m June the latter
could do Tittle more than reconnaissance. Thus to the Amoy H.Q. fell
most of the work of the first two months, and its work was further
most oi xne ne _.,„ sitv ^der the existing system of passing on all
information^to^the^uperior formation. The task was far beyond the
canacity of the existing staff of two, and a hasty expansion had to be
^ J , ruy. e nee < 3 . for an Intelligence Officer was at once felt.^
res °" e .uu e necessary experience was available and the battalion
in JemsSem^ already short of officers, had to be called u^on to produce
yet another staff officer. When reinforcements first started to