Coll 6/74 'Foreign Office memorandum entitled "The Seven Independent Arabian States." (Yemen, Asir, the Hejaz, Nejd, Kowait, Jebel Shammar, and Jauf.)' [‎6v] (12/28)

successor designate, he began to cherish the design of freeing the Emirate from
dependence on Turkey, and though professing himself to have no ambition towards
the Caliphate, the same could not be said for Abdullah, either as his father s
adviser or, perhaps, when considering his own future interests. Husein, in fact,
had made effective use of his earlier expeditions in support of the Ottoman Power
to organise and train a Bedouin force, which he intended to employ for his own ^
purposes if need or opportunity should arise. In 1913 he was able to follow a
policy definitely in opposition to Turkish aims. He openly opposed the extension
of the Hejaz railway southward to Mecca and supported his Harb tribesmen in
their vehement hostility to this and other Turkish designs. When war broke out
in 1914 he refused his assistance to the Turks in raising troops from the Hejaz,
but he continued to organise the tribesmen for insurrection when the moment
should come. He reconciled himself with the Idrisi and endeavoured to unite
that prince and the Imam of the Yemen with himself in following a common anti-
Ottoman policy. In 1915 he sent Abdullah to Central Arabia to make peace
between Ibn Rashid of Hail and Ibn Baud, and to obtain again payments to Mecca
from Qasim and Sedeir in northern Nejd.
The strength of the Emir’s position before the Arab rising began may be
judged by the consideration shown to him by the Turks. He received a large
annual subsidy from the Ottoman Treasury. He was styled “ Highness.” He
had his own force of Arab regulars, paid by himself, and his own police, who
exercised authority as far south as eastern Asir. He was chief executive officer
in Mecca itself. He alone could call up Hejazis for military service, who were
thus exempt from Turkish conscription, and he alone could levy and collect taxes
in Mecca and Medina; he could also levy contributions from funds belonging to
the Ottoman authorities in the Hejaz. In addition, as has been seen, he could,
for the benefit of Mecca, lay Qasim and Sedeir under tribute.
‘ The Ottoman side of the bargain compelled the Emir to admit Turkish
garrisons in all Hejazi towns as the Turks might require, to accept a Turkish
Governor-General, or Y^ali, in Mecca or Taif according to season, and sub-
Governors and administrative officials in five other centres. The Turkish garrison
at the beginning of 1916 was about 12,000 men, stationed at Mecca, Medina, Taif,
Jedda and other ports, and along the Hejaz railway. At this time Husein had
become the de facto power in the Hejaz, with wide influence extending southward
to eastern Asir, northward to the southern Aneiza tribes, and eastward to Central
Arabia. He had, in fact, confined Turkish authority to the areas held by Turkish
garrisons.
Behind these outward manifestations of growing influence and power, the
moment was fast approaching for Husein to attempt the execution of his
ambitions, which had, indeed, greatly widened since Turkey entered the war, as
had also his prospects. From the 30th October, 1914, he had, in fact, become a
prince whose goodwill, influence and active assistance would be exceedingly
valuable to Great Britain.
This is not the place in which to detail the history of how the Emir of Mecca
came to co-operate with Great Britain in a war against the Ottoman Empire,
ruled by a Sultan who was Khalifa of Islam. That intricate story belongs to the
history of the Arab rising. Suffice it to say now that in September 1914 the Emir
of Mecca’s son, Abdullah, was cautiously approached by Lord Kitchener, who
knew him personally, and that between this opening enquiry and the end of 1915
an exchange of letters between His Majesty’s Government’s representative in
Cairo and the Emir (a correspondence which did not cover the whole ground and
was not always explicit upon the points sought to be defined) committed both
parties to courses at the time highly acceptable to both. These negotiations
revealed the vast extent to which the ambitions of Husein had now grown.
The independence of the Hejaz had become merely the nucleus for a design
which took a part of south-eastern Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia, and
almost the whole of Arabia for its field. Calling these regions the “Arab
Countries,” he aspired to see them freed from Turkish rule, where it was then
established, and united under one sovereignty, or, as several independent States,
into a confederation acknowledging an Arab suzerain. Though sometimes
professing indifference as to who the Sovereign or Suzerain should be, provided
unification were attained, Husein had himself or his immediate successor in view.
Behind these aspirations for the enlargement of his temporal authority remained
the delicate question of an Arab Caliphate.