‘REPORT FOR THE ARMY COUNCIL ON MESOPOTAMIA’ [‎16r] (36/94)

(C 1781) D 2
tfon that the exnenrHtnrp na ^ a^° & n ^ eni P^ iat i ca lly of opinion that there is no ground for the sugges-
Ivelonlnts and weT A ^ ^ ^ been pr ° m P ted the desire to ^de for after peace
developments and we consider that they have been uniformly expended with the primary object of
securing the efficiencv and comfort of the fnree Ttof ^ -u x • . F , , J 1
nri c q Kocr. ,10 i ^ ^ i • Ine i Iorce ‘ -*■ ^ at there are a number of instances in which Army
funds have been used for undertakings, which will be only temporarily of value to the Army, while they
iTa mltterofTnmm ' ^ f T develo P ment of the civil government and the resources of Mesopotamia,
h rl faV on ' ow edge, and endeavour will now be made to enumerate the most important of
sue a undertakings, and to suggest the manner in which the civil administration should recoup Army
funds for expenditure from which it will itself derive lasting benefit.
The Port of Basrah.
o3. The port of Basrah is situated 75 miles up the Shatt-al-Arab, from the head of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
As defined by proclamation the port includes the Shatt-al-Arab, from the bar at Fao to the auxiliary port
at Nahr Umar, 17 miles above Basrah. It also includes Abadan, the headquarters of the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company. 0
The bar at .Fao limits the draught of ships coming to Basrah to from 18 feet to 20 feet. A depth of
water of 10 feet 6 inches is all that can be relied upon at the lowest tide. The question of how to deal
with this obstacle to the development of the port demands consideration as soon as peace is declared.
There is no reason to assume that the difficulties of dealing with it will prove insurmountable, or that
anything need interfere with the development of Basrah as the great port of the Middle East.
The poit is under the general administration of a Port Director, who receives his orders from the
Inspector-General of Communications, and i| kept by him in touch with railway and flotilla require
ments. The Directorate has been organized so far as is compatible with military requirements on the
ines of the Directorate of a modern commercial port. Subordinate to the Director are :—
(а) The I ort Engineer, who constructs and maintains all wharves and wharf machinery, and carries
out port surveys. Very complete surveys have been made during 1917 of the river from the
outer bar to Gurmat Ali, where the Euphrates joins the Tigris. Two survey parties were
enga-ged for about six months on this work, and one survey party has since been maintained
to keep the survey work up to date. The survey work done so far was clearly for militarv
purposes.
(б) The Port Officer, who is in charge of the sea discipline of the port, and controls the pilots (Arabs)
who bring ships from the bar to a point half a mile below Basrah itself, and harbour masters
(British) who move ocean ships above the entrance to Basrah. He also controls the pilot
brig, which lies off the bar.
(c) The officers in charge of the port traffic, who unload all ships into the port badges, or to the
wharves of the various receiving departments.
For the use of vessels lying in the stream there is deep water accommodation sufficient to provide
swinging moorings for 24 vessels of 450 feet length and 25 to 30 feet draught, enough to suffice for the
port for many years to come. The arrangements for lighting and buoying the port are good.
55. The conditions of the port as it exists at present are in striking contrast to those w'hich obtained
during the earlier periods of the history of the expeditionary force in Mesopotamia and indeed until
June, 1916. The following description of these conditions is given in the report of the Mesopotamia
Commission :—
“ Port of Basra. Up to October, 1914, Basra was a comparatively small commercial
port, at which the arrival of two or three steamers was a full weekly allowance. Owing to a
bar at Fao, only vessels drawing not more than 18 to 19 feet can reach Basra. It w r as largely
a port of transit for Baghdad and other places up the river, to and from which cargo was con
veyed by Messrs. Lynch Brothers’ steamers or by mahailas. The equipment of the port was
primitive and barely in keeping with the modest volume of its trade. There were no wharves
for ocean steamers, and the merchants’ warehouses were of small dimensions.
“ The facilities were, from the first, inadequate to cope with the needs of the Expeditionary
Force, and to give reasonably rapid despatch to steamers bringing supplies. As the force
grew, and as the line of communications and voyages of the river steamers lengthened, con
gestion at the port became greater. Administration of the port, direction of the mooring
of shipping, provision of lighters or mahailas, and discharge of cargo overside, were placed
in the hands of an officer of the Royal Indian Marine, under the Inspector-General of Com
munications. Reception of cargo ashore was in the hands of various military authorities,
wffio each had their depots, such as Supplies and Transport, Ordnance, Medical, &c. When
traffic grew, accommodation for receiving and storing cargo ashore proved more and more
inadequate. Most of the land round Basra w^as subject to flooding at the period of high river,
but it was not covered deeply, and, if foundations were raised, or the w^ater kept out by earth
dykes, stores were free from risk of damage. After struggling with congestion at Basra a
decision w^as ultimately come to late in 1915 to handle a portion of the traffic at Magill, situated
about 5 miles above Basra. Here the depth of water permitted ocean steamers to come close
in to the bank. By the aid of moored mahailas and planks, improvised landing stages were
constructed, across which cargo could be carried from ocean steamers to the stores. At a
ater date ^December, 1915—it was decided to construct proper wharves and otherwise improve