'Reports of administration for 1918 of divisions and districts of the occupied territories in Mesopotamia. Volume I' [‎58r] (120/470)

Captain MacWhinnie had a detachment of about 50 trained Hillah men at
Najaf.
It soon became apparent that an attempt must be made to train and to discipline
the actual Shamiyah men. The existence of trained Hillah men at Najaf under
a British officer and of a large undisciplined, but armed, rabble throughout the
Division very little controlled and of not much practical use, was an anomaly.
At the same time the Division was being re-organised with Najaf as headquarters.
At Najaf itself little training could be done. It is an unpleasant place for the men
to live in, food is dear, and water a real difficulty. Therefore when the headquarters
of the Division moved to Najaf, Captain MacWhinnie moved down to Kufah, which
was made the Shabanah headquarters of the Division, and assumed charge of the
whole Shamiyah Shabanah.
It still remained to be seen, however, what would be the outlook of the men
themselves on the new order of things, and the prospects of drill, discipline, and
uniform. With the object of going slow, the Abu -Sukhair men had been excluded
temporarily from the sweeping reforms it was hoped to introduce until it could be
seen how they would be taken.
Captain MacWhinnie has well described in his report the difficulties that he
went through, and how he finally succeeded not only in overcoming prejudice but
also in creating enthusiasm. Suffice it to say that, after the initial stages had passed,
the men rapidly learnt drill and clamoured for uniform, and no difficulty whatever
was experienced in getting the Abu Sukhair men to come into line.
The fact that the Division was largely untrodden ground, its size, the difficulty
of communications, and the density of the population, all made it difficult to fix
upon a suitable number for a Shabanah force, and several revisions were necessary.
The final sanctioned number is 722, composed of 13 officers, 589 piada, and 122 sawari.
The numbers at present stand at some 550.
The effort throughout has been to make Kufah the central training ground,
but the necessity of having men continually on duty throughout the Division has
made concentration difficult. B.O.R.s are therefore stationed at Umm al Ba‘rur
and Abu Sukhair, and train the men there. This system has worked well, but a
great increase in efficiency will be secured when we have sufficient numbers to
permit of a man being in for training six months in the year, and out on district
work the other six.
The amount of duties undertaken by the Shamiyah Shabanah may be gauged
when it is realised that the guard duties of 280 troops have been taken over, and
that there are some 15 to 20 small posts (including the Qusur) throughout the
Division.
At present the duties of the Shabanah are providing patrols on the desert line,
guarding Government houses and property such as offices and bridges, garrisoning
small posts, providing escorts, and arresting offenders. They are also trained to
work as a body and especial attention is paid to training in guard duties.
They are a smart, well-clothed, well-disciplined, and useful force. That they
have become so when every condition seemed adverse is entirely due to the efforts
of Captain MacWhinnie, and Lieut. White, who, later, joined as bis assistant.
The British personnel employed is two British officers and five B.O.R.s. An
additional British officer is urgently called for. -
The efficiency of Shabanah in small posts, a necessary condition in this Division,
depends upon constant inspection and touring on the part of the officers. It may
be mentioned that to tour and inspect every post in the Division, including the
Qusur, takes 12 days, going hard. It is hoped that the Police will soon be able to
take over all duties at Najaf, and this will release more Shabanah for training and
district work. The Division is w~eak in Sow T ari, and Government aid in horses
will be called for if we are successfully to staff the Qusur line.
The need of Shabanah barracks at Kufah capable of accommodating 400 men
is a very urgent one. There is no suitable Government building. There is, how
ever, a suitable site and the construction of barracks on a modern plan should be
taken in hand as soon as possible. Till then, it is suggested that housing in E.P.
tents would be suitable. A permanent camp could be set up without difficulty,
and this would certainly improve the comfort as well as the discipline of the men,
in addition to releasing some of the occupied houses to their proper owners.
The Arab officer is a real difficulty, and I am in full agreement with Captain
MacWhinnie that a central training school is called for.
Captain MacWhinnie’s report is added as an Appendix.