'Military Report on Mesopotamia (Iraq)' [‎98r] (200/226)

the Nisibin-Mosul route via Hogena and that via Balad
Sinjar. The latter is impassable to wheels and would not
furnish water for more than one regiment, while the
forcing of the Jabal Sinjar against a small force entails
at least a division skilled in mountain warfare. There
remains the route via Hogena. Hogena, known by the
tribes as the “ Hogena Gate,” lies in a pass between two
snicill i anges of hills and is the first place where anything
more than one^ cavalry regiment could operate. Between
Demii Kapu Khan and Hogena there is a large waterless
stretch, which can only be crossed by one cavalry regiment
at a time owing to the water supply. The line of hills
from east of Hogena to Eski Mosul on the Tigris and con
tinued westward to Tel Afar and Jabal Sinjar constitute
a defensive position which could be held by a division,
and would require two to three divisions for a successful
offensive. The Hogena Gate is, therefore, of strategic
importance and especially favours the defensive, since
it is accessible to wheel transport and has no difficulties
in the way of water supply. Tel Afar and Mosul are
incidentally the centres of one of the richest wheat areas
in Iraq. The Jabal Sinjar is of minor strategic import
ance, but could be employed, as it was during the war,
as a flank position from which to attack and raid forces
and convoys coming from Nisibin. It would not require
much labour to lay a light railway along the Mosul-
Nisibin embankment constructed by the Germans in 1918.
The advantages of inner lines, supplies, water, and move
ment of transport all favour the defensive.
(b) Offensive .—An offensive against Nisibin is im
possible on a large scale without the construction of the
Mosul-Nisibin Railway.
In considering Northern Jazirah, it must be remem
bered that its military problems, so far as they concern
the Iraq Government, cannot be considered apart from
those of Iraq as a whole. Assuming then that adequate
arrangements have been made for the remainder of Iraq,
it is necessary to delimit (i) strategical positions,
(ii) number of troops required for defence, and (iii) the
type and characteristics of such troops in Northern
Jazirah.
The Jazirah consists of rolling downlands and desert
cut by the Jabal Sinjar (3,000 to 4,700 feet high), an
effective bastion flanking the approaches from Dair al
Zor and Nisibin. Both are the chief highways of com
merce and suitable approaches for a force of all arms
towards Mosul under certain circumstances. The forces