'Military Report on Mesopotamia (Iraq)' [‎26v] (57/226)

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In such a contingency the Ai’ab Government would be
supported by all the tribes excepting perhaps the Tai,
who might conceivably help the Yezidis. If, on the other
hand, the Shammar made an attack on the latter, it
would probably only have to deal with 6,000 rifles of the
Shammar and be aided by the Tai and Tel Afaris.
(iii) Tel Afar .—Tel Afar, conceivably as a result of
Turkish intrigue, might rise against the Arab Govern
ment, if the desert tribes came in with the townsmen.
In 1920, the tribal forces against the British were found
from the Shammar, Jubur, Juhaish, and Girgiriyah, but
never numbered more than 250 rifles. In the event of a
similar rising on a larger scale,
would be: —
the numbers involved
Rifles.
Tel Afaris
960
Shammar
6,000
Mutaiwid
250
Juhaish
380
Girgiriyah
200
Jubur (Khabur)
1,825
9,615
It is probable, however, that the force to be encountered
would never exceed 2,000 rifles. In this contingency the
Yezidis and Tai might be employed in attacking hostile
villages and raiding the Tel Afar-Sinjar roads.
(iv) Nisibin .—The chief tribes which visit Nisibin in
Turkish territory are the Tai, Shammar and Jubur of
the Khabur. The Tai are almost entirely dependent
on Nisibin for supplies, while the Shammar not only use
it as a winter market, but pasture their flocks near the
town in that season. The Jubur are in a position to cut
communications between Dair al Zor and Nisibin, so the
Turks are consequently anxious to keep on friendly terms
with them. Nisibin only indirectly concerns the Iraq
authorities, but might prove of vital interest in case of a
Turkish move on Mosul. In such case, it might be
possible for the Arab Government to utilize the
Shammar, Tai and Yezidis to attack the Turkish lines of
communication. On the other hand, the Turks might
induce the Tai and..Shammar to throw in their lot with
them, and the Yezidis would then alone he available for
very hypothetical raids on the lines of communication.