'Military Report on Mesopotamia (Iraq)' [‎17r] (38/226)

to operate in the vicinity of the main roads, but in the
desert areas, except in particularly rainy seasons, water
will ordinarily he sufficient for a cavalry regiment.
Wherever springs are used as a water supply, great care
should he taken that these have not been contaminated by
local caravans and Badawin. In case of wells, these
should he thoroughly examined for decaying vegetation.
At no time is it safe to utilize water, except after
chlorination or other chemical treatment.
Conclusion .—Consideration of the foregoing indicates
not only that the period of probable unrest lies between
October and April, but that the most suitable period for
military operations lies between these months.
CHAPTER IV.
RESOURCES.
1 . General .—Northern Jazirah is an agricultural and
pastoral district, which possesses few minerals, and these
are not extensively worked. There are no manufactures
on a large scale, while lack of surplus commodities and
machinery for external trade renders the latter almost
negligible. Its commerce is purely parochial- the inter
change between its own sub-districts and with the larger
towns of the actual necessities oi' life. Lack of labour,
insecurity and antiquated methods of agriculture limit
production to the actual requirements of food, clothes
and shelter.
2 . Industry. —A. Labour.
(a) Supply .—Outside the peasant-farmers, who are at
one and the same time labourers and masters, there is
practically no labour supply in Northern Jazirah. This
follows from ( 1 ) sparseness of population resultant on
insecurity, and the fact that a man often does not reap
where he has sown ; ( 2 ) the tribal system, which neces
sitates the partial unemployment of a large element and
inculcates, at least amongst the Bedawin, the desire to
avoid labour and gather the fruits of another’s labour in
raid and foray; (3) the system of land tenure, which has