'File 6/4 Correspondence with Air Headquarters, Baghdad, and other RAF officers in Iraq' [‎152r] (303/522)

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CONFIDENTIAL
H.lvl’s Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. ,
KtlYAIT.
C/0 Kuv/ait Oil Compan^^Ltd.,
KUWAIT.
ARABIA.
22nd April, 19-42. / O
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'♦ aNPNDITION II-ri 1 0 SAUDI ANABIA ON 19-4--42
IN SKAHai OF 3 FORCE-LANDSD AIliCLIAFT”
MStvIORANDUH " '
Reference our conversation of yesterday (21-A-42), the following is
a brief record of iahat happened.
(a) On 19-4-42 I left Magv/a at 5-30 P*ia. accompanied by Dr. A.L.Greenway,
the K.O.C. Headguard, a second guard and a guide.
(b) We reached Shadhaf in the Neutral Zone 9 p.m.
(c) At 4 a.m. on 20-^42, ^ proceeded to Arq wells (southertiborder of Neutral
Zone). There we turned east till the coast Y/as reached(3 hours). We carefully
searched whole coastal region round Ain Awaija, Jebel Amuda and Ras Hishaat
as far as vicinity of Ras Safaniyeh.
(d) Fifteen miles from Ras Safaniyeh vre learned from some Awazim badawin that
3 aircraft had on previous day crashed near the small village of Safaniyeh,
situated on south side of the promontory of that name, but that airmen were
safe and vrere being looked after by Bin Saud’s guards there.
(e) At 11-30 a.m. we arrived at Safaniyeh and found Flight Lieut Bird and two
others ( a Polish Sergeant Major Pilot, and an Australian Sergeant Pilot) safe
and well though somewhat shaken. Of their 3 aircraft one lay 2+00 yards away,
'and tv/o some 2 miles to the North west. All three had their propellers smashed
off with under carriages damaged and one stood on its nose in a salt pan.
(f) I told the airmen to collect their personal kit, food, and any equipment
or papers of a secret nature and have same stacked near the nearest aircraft,
but that nothing belonging properly to the aircraft proper such as wireless,
machine guns, ammunition etc should be touched. I explained that I intended
taking them back to Kuwait at once, but that their machines and everything
pertaining to them would be left behind in charge of the King* s guards, until
such times as they received proper orders from the Saudi authorities.
(f) I next visited the guards* tent; had coffee with them and explained rry
intention to them. This I did after expressing the British Government’s and
my own appreciation and thinks for the excellent treatment wiiich they had meted
out to the stranded airmen during their 24 hours enforced stay v/ith them.
(There was no actual Amir at Safaniyeh but the head guard acted apparently in
that capacity).
(g) The guards gave nyself and our relief j^rty a good welcome, offered to
kill a sheep for us, and explained that they were ready to do anything to help,
that they had been more than anxious to assist the marooned airmen the previous
day but that all their efforts to make themselves understood had failed dismally.
(h) Just before I left for Kuwait, the guards asked me for a letter to put
them right v/ith the Amir of Jariyah to whom they had already sent a report by
camel man of the landing of the aircraft.
(CONTD)