Coll 6/9 'Jeddah Reports Jany 1931–' [‎393v] (787/802)

authorities in Iransjordan, including His Majesty’s High Commissioner, who
expressed an even more serious view of the consequences of a secession of Trans
jordan Bedouins to Ibn Sand, in view of the difficult situation it would create in
the event of trouble in Palestine.
16. On the 6th February the Foreign Office instructed Sir A. Ryan to make
the strongest possible representations. As these instructions had in effect crossec^
his report on his own recent action, he suggested that, having regard to the more
favourable turn taken by his conversations in Jedda, it might be unwise to take so
strenuous a line as that contemplated at home. There ensued an active corres
pondence, the result of which was that the Foreign Office consented to an attempt
being made to reach an understanding with Ibn Saud, but indicated the lines on
which the representations were to be made to him in a precise memorandum, the
terms of which were in no way to be weakened and a copy of which was to be left
with the King, if Sir A. Ryan thought it advisable. Every effort was to be made
to obtain a definite reply within four days and the King was to be informed, if
necessary, that this was expected by His Majesty’s Government.
17. On receipt of his final instructions His Majesty's Minister, who had
contemplated a strong but conversational onslaught on the King, thought that, as
the basis of the representations was to be a long memorandum in set terms, it
would, after all, be better to communicate it first to the Hejazi Government and
see the King afterwards. His Majesty’s Government having concurred, the
Legation forwarded it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 28th February,
slightly modified in accordance with suggestions made by His Majesty’s High
Commissioner for Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan . The memorandum was accompanied by a short
covering note requesting an early audience to discuss the question and intimating
His Majesty’s Government’s desire to obtain a definite reply to their memorandum
as soon as possible. A separate note sent earlier in the same day, also under
instructions, strongly repudiated the aspersions which had been cast on Captain
Glubb in the course of the conversations and correspondence in February.
18. In their memorandum of the 28th February His Majesty’s Government
propounded the following points in the nature of suggestions or demands, with
the necessary explanatory comments : —
(1) Noting Ibn Saud’s expressed readiness to bring article 3 of the Hadda
Agreement into operation and having in view the proved necessity
for immediate co-operation between the authorities on both sides of the
frontier, they proposed, in pursuance of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin’s request
for suggestions as to the method of initiating such co-operation, that
Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should meet (a) to examine all repre
sentatives and claims regarding raids since the 1st August; (b) to
arrange for immediate restoration of loot on both sides; and (c) to
arrange for the intercommunication of information and mutual
restoration of loot in future.
(2) They asked that Ibn Zeid should be invested with full executive powers,
and that he and Captain Glubb should have power to call upon the
representative sheikhs to put forward claims, &c.
(3) Having explained the inability of the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan authorities to
maintain the recent improvement of the situation unless immediate
steps should be taken to return the loot captured from their tribes
since the 1st August, His Majesty’s Government dwelt on various
flagrant features of those raids, including the proved culpability of
En Neshmi and his public statement that Ibn Saud permitted raiding
into Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , a statement widely believed and not effectively
disproved. They said they “ must insist that if this has not already
been done, the strongest measures should be taken to counteract the
effect of En Neshmi’s action in giving countenance to raiding and to
make it publicly known that His Majesty King Abdul Aziz expressly
disavows and condemns it.” They expressed hope that a recent report
of En Neshmi’s appointment to the command of tribal forces would
prove to be unfounded.
(4) They asked the Hejazi Government to inform them as soon as possible
that they agreed to the proposed meeting and that Ibn Zeid would
receive full powers to deal with the matters proposed, including the
immediate restitution of camels and other loot captured from Trans-