Coll 6/9 'Jeddah Reports Jany 1931–' [‎383r] (766/802)

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they were not in uniform when attacked, it was considered certain by the
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan authorities that one had been murdered after the raiders had
ascertained that they w T ere attacking policemen. It w r as alleged later, on the
evidence of two men who claimed to have been in Jauf when the raiders returned,
that the latter were w^armly congratulated by the new Governor Turki-as-Sudairi
and w 7 ere authorised to keep what they had captured as a rew 7 ard for their prow r ess.
15. In the course of the correspondence in March and April, the
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan authorities made it a practice to suggest that Hejaz-Nejd subjects
wdio had been victims of admitted raids or might be entitled to restitution in more
doubtful cases, should report to Captain Glubb. In one such case, the Hejazi
Government intimated that the Governor of A1 Ula would send an agent to
Captain Glubb to take delivery. In three others they stated that, as the victims
could not go to him in person, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Zeid had been instructed
to discuss the cases wdth him. (See the following section.)
General Frontier Situation.
16. The discussions arising out of the British memorandum (January-
February report, paragraph 18) overshadowed all other questions between the
Legation and the Heiazi Government throughout March and April. Sir A. Ryan
emphasised the gravity of the situation in a long interview with Ibn Saud on the
2nd March. The King w 7 as impressed, but in replies returned on the 3rd March
to the Legation's tw T o communications of the 28th February, he maintained a bold
front. The reply to the separate note regarding Captain Glubb w T as reasonably
satisfactory in form, and except for a carefully-worded suggestion of arbitrary
conduct on his part in one later note no further accusations were subsequently
made against him. The reply to the main British memorandum was largely
evasive. The King reaffirmed his intention of bringing article 3 of the Hadda
Agreement into operation, but maintained that the proposed meeting between
Captain Glubb and Sheikh Abdul Aziz would serve no useful purpose until
agreement had been reached as to (a) the method of dealing w T ith raids since
Mr. MacDonnell began his investigation, and (b) the principles to be observed
by the two representatives. As regards (a), he claimed the return by Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
of stated quantities of loot. The most important point laid down as regards (b)
was that, in the case of large-scale raids, Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should
exchange information and, if necessary, meet, but that any decisions they might
take should be ad referendum. The King agreed that raids during a meeting like
the MacDonnell investigation were scandalously un-Bedouin, but accused
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan of having started the new series of raids on the 26th July. He
refused to condemn En Neshmi, who had done his duty and whom he had dismissed
only to avoid controversy w T ith His Majesty’s Government. He undertook to
instruct Ibn Zeid to meet Captain Glubb on receipt of a reply from His Majesty's
Government. Fie refused any restoration of loot to Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan until a start had
been made on the other side. He declined, wdth thanks, His Majesty's Govern
ment’s offer of assistance in the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan, thanking God that he had pow er
over all his subjects. The only help he asked for w 7 as that criminals fleeing into
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan should be handed back.
17. After carefully considering their next move, His Majesty’s Government
decided that the Hejazi reply, while in many ways evasive and unsatisfactory,
did not exclude the achievement of their essential purpose, namely, that of
bringing about an immediate meeting of the frontier authorities and the settle
ment of the questions at issue on a local and tribal basis. Ihey were unable to
accept all the principles proposed by Ibn Saud for observance by the repre
sentatives, although they did so very reluctantly as regards the clause providing
for reference of their decisions to higher authority. Two further memoranda
were exchanged on the 10th and 12th March. Space does not admit of repro
ducing all their details. The Hejazi memorandum of the 12th March split further
hairs, but still did net make the meeting impossible. There ensued from it a
British proposal, put forward on the suggestion of Sir J. Chancellor, that
Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid should hold a preliminary meeting limited to the
exchange of information and views as to the best means of policing the frontier.
Ibn Saud w 7 as again sticky over this. It w 7 as eventually agreed towards the middle
April that such a meeting should take place, but only after the King had scouted
the idea that there need be any discussion of measures of police and stressed his