Coll 6/9 'Jeddah Reports Jany 1931–' [‎344r] (688/802)

Denmark.
54. There being no Danish representative here, His Majesty’s Government
were asked to have enquiries made by the Legation as to the fate of an adventurous
Dane, with results that are told in paragraph 31
„ . ^ . IV. —Air Matters.
Heyaz Air torce Machines.
55. Following on the crash of one machine (September-October report,
paragraph 6), and the departure of the last British pilot (ibidem, paragraph 62),
the four Wapitis remained in their hangar throughout November and December.
No one was in particular charge of them. The British engineer who looks after
the local sea-water condensers was occasionally asked to look at them; he reported
that the engines were apparently sufficiently well greased, but that the fabric
and stays were suffering from moth and rust respectively. The roof of the hangar
then fell in; the machines were moved to an adjacent spot where they were kept
under lock and key and a cover of cotton sheets.
Hejaz Air Force Personnel.
56. On the 7th November the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs gave a
private hint to His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires that if His Majesty’s Govern
ment were to propose that a British aviation mission should be sent to the Hejaz,
he would be prepared to urge I bn Saud to accept it. The position, he explained,
had changed since the King had refused an offer of even partial assistance in
1927, and Fuad Hamza was now so anxious to avoid the impression of Anglo-
Hejazi estrangement which would be given by their engagement of a personnel
other than British that he was ready to act as indicated. He was not in a strong
enough position to do more.
57. To this suggestion, and to the King’s definite proposals reported in
paragraph 67 of the September-October report, His Majesty’s Government
replied on the 14th November. They pointed out, firstly, that their willingness
to select new personnel for the Hejaz Air Force was based on the Hejazi Govern
ment’s proposals of the 17th June (May-June report, paragraph 56), which were
superseded by the King’s proposals referred to above. These had been
sympathetically considered, but could not be accepted. The King’s request that
the personnel should be “under his orders for every purpose” could not be
complied with, for reasons already stated (September-October report,
paragraph 66, first sentence), while the alternative proposal to engage British
personnel for instruction and maintenance and non-British personnel for
operations could not be accepted, as it would be unworkable in practice owing to
divided responsibility. His Majesty's Charge d’Affaires was also informed that
even the June proposals, if revived, would have to be subject to major conditions,
(a) that the personnel should not be employed for warlike operations or against
rebels, the Government of India having revived their previous objections on this
point, and (b) that no foreign personnel should be engaged for flying the aircraft
for which British personnel would be responsible. Moreover, the lack of instruc
tional machines, the language difficulty, &c., were, in any case, serious obstacles
to the success of the scheme; while complications over the payment and treatment
of the personnel would have been inevitable, in view of the state of the Hejazi
finances. The scheme would thus, in any case, have had to be abandoned. The
suggestion of an air mission had already been tentatively considered; but ft
would not meet Ibn Sand's apparent desire to use the pilots against possible
enemies or rebels, while its cost, no part of which His Majesty’s Government
could bear in the existing crisis, would be greater than that of an unofficial
personnel.
58. The decisions regarding Ibn Sand’s later proposals and the air mission
suggestion were duly communicated to him through Fuad Hamza. On the
22nd November the latter forwarded a message from the King regretting His
Majesty’s Government’s decision, reaffirming that he did not "wish to use the
personnel for warlike operations against anyone but must have them under
his orders whenever necessary for defence, and stating that, while he understood
His Majesty's Government's attitude, he was obliged to look for personnel else
where. This was not the first little rift in the lute, but it began to affect the tune.