Coll 6/9 'Jeddah Reports Jany 1931–' [‎304v] (609/802)

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240. The Ibn Rifada adventure itself came to an inglorious end on the
30th July, except for the carnage in detail which followed. There is still much
obscurity as to the movements and number of the rebels. It is probable that the
whole of Ibn Rifada's forces, including tribal elements who joined him in the
Hejaz, never exceeded 1,000 men, inadequately armed and mounted and suffering
from shortage of food, owing to the measures taken by the authorities in Trcms^
Jordan, Palestine and Egypt to prevent supplies 'from reaching them by lamCT*
sea. The rebels had tarried long at or near Haql, but in July they moved south
until the bulk of them were at Huraiba and Sherma, places on or close to the sea
eastward from the southern end of the Gulf of Aqaba. There was some prospect
of their attacking Muweyla or even Dhaba, where Ibn Sand had garrisons, and
they were reported at one moment to be threatening the road between the two.
241. Meanwhile Ibn Saud had been continuing his preparations slowly but
methodically. The principal forces intended to be used were the Akhwan levies,
which had been summoned to assemble at A1 Ula. It is not known how many
gathered there. Estimates varied from 1,500 to 10,000, a Hejazi figure and
probably much exaggerated. Whatever the number at A1 Ula, it was sufficient to
enable an important contingent under Ibn Aqil to be moved to Dhaba, whence the
Akhwan, working in with other Government forces, including camelry under
Ibn Sultan, the following of the Amir of Dhaba and a party from Taif under one
of the King's own henchmen, marched against the rebels. They located the main
body of the latter, apparently some 400 men, at Jebel Shar, a position inland from
the road between Dhaba and Muweyla. The battle, or battue, took place on the
30th July. According to the official reports, 370 rebels were killed on the field, a
remnant, including twenty men of the Beni Atiya, escaped, and the losses on the
Government side were only nine. Ibn Saud gave orders that in the subsequent
round-up all persons who had joined the rebels should be killed. Reports
published subsequently recorded the slaughter of various parties of rebels in the
area between Muweyla, Haql and Alagan, a place some distance inland from Haql.
242. News from Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan in the course of August indicated a possibility
of a rally of rebel fragments, Imran tribesmen and Beni Atiya, notably those left
over from the party which entered the Hejaz on the night of the 26th June (see
paragraph 184), at Alagan. If this rally took place, the rebels would appear to
have made no effective stand. Much less is known, however, as to what had
happened up to the end of August between Alagan and the Hejaz Railway. The
position at the end of the month appeared to be that the majority of Ibn Aqil's
Akhwan had been sent back to Dhaba, but that there might be a further movement
of Government forces from Tebuk to clean up any disaffected area east of Alagan.
The Beni Atiya party under Ibn Farhan mentioned above seems to have done
some successful raiding and to have recrossed the frontier with looted camels, but
to have doubled back again into Hejaz-Nejd and to have left some of the loot at
Alagan before dispersing.
243. During the period following the defeat of Ibn Rifada a fair number of
stragglers made good their escape into Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan . According to a telegram
from Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , dated the 31st August, there were, including women, 103 at
Aqaba and forty-seven at Maan.
244. It has been said that the Akhwan were the principal element in the
forces called up to cope with the rebellion. At first mention was made only of a
concentration at A1 Ula, to consist of some 5,000 or 6,000 from the nearer parts
of Nejd. It is not certain how many actually assembled. It looked in July as if
there might have been some lack of response to the call to arms. This in its turn
suggested the possibility of disaffection among part of the Shammar. According
to Government publications after the Battle of Jebel Shar and miscellaneous
sources of information, there was, in fact, no serious manifestation of disloyalty.
On the contrary, the Akhwan spirit was roused all over the country to an extent
embarrassing to the King. Large numbers of them came at his summons to Taif,
partly to receive their regular gifts of money, &c., partly no doubt to be ready in
case of emergency elsewhere, more especially in Asir. Sheikh Yussuf Yasin put
the number at 10,000, and another official mentioned as many as 15,000 a day or
two later. The numbers may have been exaggerated, but there were certainly not
less than 4,000 early in August, largely Ateyba, whose presence was a fairly
conclusive refutation of previous rumours of disaffection in the region round Taif
itself. Fuad Bey spoke to Sir A. Ryan of other assemblages all the way from the