'Despatch from Sir M. Durand respecting appointment of Additional Consular Officers in Persia' [‎99v] (2/18)

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changes which have taken place since the Memorandum was written, supplying at the
same time such further information as may be necessary to give a comprehensive view
of the present state of affairs.
For convenience sake, though I trust the whole Memorandum will be considered,
I will here quote the penultimate paragraph, which sums up my views and proposals.
It ran as follows :—
“ Persia is misgoverned, and her condition is not satisfactory. Her finances are
in disorder, and her resources undeveloped, and she contains some elements of
disturbance, while there is no armed force upon which the Government can depend
for the maintenance of its authority. The influence of Russia, which is antagonistic
to our own, predominates at Tehran, and it is believed to be exerted against the
interests of the country.
“ On the other hand, Persia has practically no debt, and her natural resources are
great. Her internal condition is not hopeless, or such as to cause immediate alarm.
And the influence of Russia, though predominant, is not exclusive. England has still
a strong position throughout the country; and Russia, recognizing her own weakness
in Asia, seems unlikely for the present to take any step in Persia which would
seriously offend us.
“ The general situation, therefore, might be worse, but it is not one with which
we can rest altogether satisfied.
“ It is not probable that Russia will combine with England in reorganizing the
Persian Administration, and in developing her trade; and there is little hope to be
got in this direction from other European nations, none of whom carry any weight in
Tehran.
“England by herself, especially if thwarted by Russia, cannot hope to overcome
the opposition of interested persons in high places, and to carry a scheme of reform
which will regenerate Persia. She can hardly hope, indeed, to carry any reform of
radical importance, and must fall back upon her existing policy, contenting herself
with maintaining the integrity of Persia ; watching and checking Russian aggression;
gaining the goodwill, respect, and confidence of the Persian Government and people ;
developing trade ; and taking such opportunities as may occur of urging measures
beneficial to the country.
“ "With a view to maintaining the integrity and independence of Persia, it is
desirable to make timely arrangements for securing a quiet succession on the Shah’s
death, and we should endeavour to strengthen our influence over the heir apparent by
keeping an English doctor with him, by improving the position of our Representative
at Tabreez, and in other ways. We should let it be understood that aggressive action
bv Russia in the north of Persia will immediatelv result in decided action by us in the
• * •/
south.
“ In order to strengthen the friendly feelings entertained towards us in many
parts of the country, we should encourage picked officers to travel among the Chiefs
and people, and we should, as occasion offers, establish fresh agencies at important
noints. We should try to obtain for the people such benefits as a good currency.
“The Persian Government should be made to understand that thev must not trifle
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with us in the future as they have occasionally done in the past; but we should try to
gain their goodwill, and to help them in any way we can. Just now there is an
opportunity of putting them under a great obligation by relieving them to some extent
of the burden of the Regie Debt, which they find very harassing. The Shah has
begged us earnestly to help him in this way, and has at the same time formally asked
our advice as to the reforms which should be made in his Administration. I think we
should give this advice to the best of our power, and should clear off* the Regie Debt
by lending the Persian Government half-a-million at 3 or I per cent, on approved
security, and on certain defined conditions. These conditions should include
advantages to our trade, such as the opening of the Upper Karun, and also a
satisfactory guarantee that the revenue and expenditure of the Persian Government
shall, for the future, be made to balance.
“ The probable result of such action on our part will be the introduction of a
certain measure of administrative reform, and the strengthening of our influence in
Persia, especially in the south, where we ought to be able to revive it and make it very
strong.
“ If we do not help the Persian Government in the manner indicated, we run the
risk of alienating the Sadr-i-Azam, who has been sore with us about the Regie Debt,
and of driving him and the Shah, whose greed for money is increasing with age, into
some compromising transaction with Russia.”