'British Policy in Persia. Minute by Sir A. C. Lyall' [‎109r] (1/2)

C 99.
This Document is the property of Eer Majesty's Secretary of Sta te foe India.
Confidential.
1899 .
British Policy in Persia.
Minute by Sir A. C. Lyall.
(Secret Letter from India, No. 175, 21st September 1899.—Pol. 927/99).
The Government of India, in their letter dated 21st September 1899, begin by
tatin^ that they have not been able to discover “ in their records any clear
efinition of the principles upon which our policy toward the Persian Kingdom
s based. Accordingly they concur with Sir M. Durand m his belief that the
ime has come for laying down a definite line of P°hey. T Ky proceed to
lesoribe the strategical and commercial interests of Great Britain and India
n Persia and to draw a picture of the present condition of those interests.^
I do not think that this description of the existing state of affairs contains
mvthing of importance that has not been already recognised and well under-
itood by those who have studied the question. Russian influence is pre-
nonderant in North Persia ; British influence has the advantage in the South,
rom the proximity of the sea coast; hut their respective spheres are undefined,
in paragraphs 15-19 of their letter the Government of India propose certain
measures for strengthening our position and guarding our interests at certain
places; and to these wo might agree, subject to settlement ot hnancial
^Paragraphs 20, 22, and 28 discuss the importance of certain terri
tory points or regions,—Seistan, Khorassan, the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. -whose
situation more directly affects India. All these points are said to be
more or less immediately threatened by Russia; and undoubtedly we
must resist any encroachments upon our position and influence in i .
Quarters. The Government of India declare (paragraph 47) that, in the area
(which includes these important points) of British influence, that influence
h directly 0 and increasingly challenged by other nations; and they proceed
(paragraph 50) to consider what steps should be taken ior the piotection ot
the common interests in those parts of Great Britain and India.
They be<'in by a reference to the assurances interchanged between Russia
and England concerning the maintenance of the integrity and independence of
Persia.° Presuming these pledges or engagements to be still in existence, the
Government of India place no reliance upon their effect in checking Russian
encroachments, and are of opinion that such engagements may tend
^Thev al°s™ beheve 1 that the policy of joint action by England and Russia to
imoose reforms upon Persia is impracticable; but they raise the question
whether a distinct understanding between the two European Powers tor the
separate patronage --^^^Uiotl^Me" “t.S queS, /think
tha/tlle difficulties aiul drawhacks so forcibly enumerated in paragraphs 58-61
Ke letter are decisive against attempting
spheres of interest upon the Persian
the proposition, a lint* we are contemplating a partition of the
Governmen a convi ^ essence inconsistent with our own
kk ^menUo°Sin thSpendenec and integrity of Persia, and if Russia
D nnted it she would probably treat it afterwards as a pretext for maintaining
tlTbfo r owract we had released her from her previous assurances. Nor
l 1 understand why the Government of India, having already pronounced
listing nl/ -e to be quite untrustworthy, should immediately afterwards
surest entering into a new and much more dangerous contract with
issia.
S. 59.
vntev ll" into a now UIIU inu^u mwiv, — -
'The niere suggestion might lay the British Government open to