Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎257r] (514/540)

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cngaging the services of four British pilots and six mechanics. The machines
were to he of the most modern type and therefore dear. To make things easier, His
Majesty s Government found means, by shouldering a part of the financial burden
themselves, to quote a reduced price of about £23,240 for the aeroplanes and
equipment, including a tidy supply of 201b. bombs. It was estimated that the
jannual cost of the force would he £10,000 or rather more, but Ibn Saud was too
Keen to flinch at this. The personnel were recruited with some difficulty. All
was ready by the end of 1929, too late for the force to he used to crush the rebellion,
which was already on its last legs but soon enough for the King not to go back on
his bargain.
135. The King had contemplated a base on the Nejd coast and landing
grounds at Shaara, Riadh and El-Mueh, places strung at fairly equal distances
along the stretch of about 850 miles cross-country to Jedda. He decided to make
a start at Darin Island, opposite Qatif, a spot which, except for its
isolation, proved not unsuitable and which was adequately furnished for its
purpose by the end of the year. The aeroplanes arrived at Darin iust before the
31st December, 1929.
136. The history of the air force in 1930 belied this bright beginning. Ibn
Saud s outlook on his scheme had become increasingly military, but he adhered to
his intention of haying civilian personnel. This increased the difficulty of main
taining discipline in a place like Darin, and the difficulty was aggravated by the
fact that, although the King’s agent at Bahrain looked after all financial matters,
the control of the force was placed in the hands of the Emir Feisal, Viceroy of the
Hejaz and resident at Mecca. The pilots split into two camps, one consisting of
the chief pilot and one other, who were not men of strong personality but main
tained the status of officers, while the remaining two pilots consorted freely with
the mechanics, carousing with them on occasion and fostering, it would appear,
the subversive spirit that animated some of them. A crisis arose in March, when
a drunken bout resulted in one of the two pilots who frequented the mechanics
being unfit for service on the day fixed for a flight. This led to his dismissal in
May, to which Ibn Saud consented on the strong recommendation of His Majesty’s
Government. His colleague remained to be a cause of scandal, and it was debated
whether the King should not be advised to dismiss this man also—a course which
it was desirable to avoid if possible, for Ibn Saud, having got his heart’s desire
with the help of His Majesty’s Government, showed himself jealous of his
authority over the force.
137. It had also been debated whether the King should not be urged to
transfer the force to Jedda. Fortunately, he forestalled any such idea by
himself deciding early in June to make the transfer. He requested permission to
fly the aeroplanes over Kowait, Iraq and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , the direct route being
impossible as no landing grounds had ever been' prepared; and the loan of a
Royal Air Force pilot to bring the fourth machine, in place of the dismissed
pilot, whom he had preferred not to replace. These facilities were accorded, and
after some delay, including a stop at Hinaidi, the principal Royal Air Force base
in Iraq, to fit the Wapitis with the latest improvements, the air force arrived in
Jedda on the 14th September. It went on to visit the King at Taif and then
settled down in its new home.
138. It was hoped that in the relatively civilised conditions of Jedda and
m greater proximity to the Emir Feisal, the air force would regain the moral
which had been so shaken by indiscipline at Darin. The question of promoting
the dismissal of the one remaining pilot, who had been a source of difficulty
there, was left in abeyance. Any hope of an improvement at Jedda speedily
disappeared, however. Pilots and mechanics came to a place where there had
never been a distinction among true Britons. As they were all civilians, the
difficulty due to the necessity of making a distinction between officers and
mechanics might have been overcome had it not been for what had happened in
Darin. As it was they could not be easily fitted into the framework of the
British community without prejudice to the position of the chief pilot and the
colleague who was loyal to him; and what was not easy in itself was made
impossible by the attitude of the third pilot. He continued to consort with the
mechanics. He was not on speaking terms with his colleagues, lived apart and
held studiously aloof from most of the British community, including the members