'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎83r] (165/248)

163
V
177. The evidence also indicates that on various
occasions the medical arrangements might have been
improved by better organisation and co ordination between
the different services, and for this defect the local officers
are responsible. We cannot, however, absolve the
military and medical authorities in India from responsi
bility for many of these deficiencies, in particular for the
continuing neglect to supply the expeditionary force with
that separate transport for sick and wounded, both by
land and water, which the teaching of experience has
shown to be essential in a properly organised enterprise
of this character. We include the military authorities
in India in this criticism, because the medical services are
part of the military organisation. The officer directly
responsible is, however, the Director of Medical Services,
India. This appointment was held at the beginning of
the war by Surgeon-General W. Babtie, who left India
on June 6th, 1915. He was succeeded by Surgeon-
General J. G. McNeece on July 8th, 1915, and the latter
proceeded on sick leave on April 15th, 1916. We are
informed that Surgeon-General McNeece was appointed
by the Secretary of State without any reference to the
military authorities in India. The responsibility for the
want of river transport, on the other hand, is a matter
which concerns the military authorities directly.
178. We realise the serious character of such findings,
but in view of the fact that we are definitely required to
assign the responsibility for the breakdown it is obviously
our duty to do so to the best of our ability. We think,
however, that the authorities referred to have been much
hampered by changes in policy, and by lack of timely
information as to the ultimate objective of the expedition.
In criticising the action of the authorities in India, we think,
further, that full consideration should be given to the
unprecedented strain which has recently been put on all
their available resources. Not only has it been necessary
to supply the demands of at least four Expeditionary
Forces overseas, and to make preparations for frontier and
internal requirements on a large scale, but arrangements
have also had to be made for the reception and treatment
in India of invalids from France, Gallipoli, Egypt, and
East Africa. Moreover, the assistance in the matter of
personnel, equipment and stores which, in less abnormal
times, might have been expected from outside India,
has, until recently, seldom been available. W T e have,
generally speaking, nothing but praise for the work of the
executive medical officers in Mesopotamia, and we have
abundant evidence that they have done marvellously well
with little material. On the other hand, we consider that
»ome of the administrative medical officers, though always
anxious to do what was right, were at times wanting in
foresight as to the probable needs of the force, less insistent
than they should have been in pressing their demands for
essential requirements, and on one or two occasions
lacking in energy and power of resource in the measures
taken for the accommodation and comfort of the sick and
wounded.
179. We desire to express our grateful thanks to many
officers who have assisted us in our inquiries. Where so
many have helped, it is difficult to select particular
persons ; but we do not think that we ought to omit the
names of Lieutenant-General Sir Percy Lake, Major-
General Money, General Staff, Major-General Cowper,
D.A. and Q.M.G., Colonel Irvine, D.D.M.S., Captain
Hamilton, D.A.D.M.S., Colonel Winter, A.Q.M.G., Major
W. N. Campbell, D.A.A.G., Captain Macrae, D.A.Q.M.G.,
and Captain T. Murphy, the officer in charge of the medical
statistical branch of the Adjutant General’s office at the
Base. We have also to acknowledge the great assistance
given us by all branches at Army Headquarters, India.
We think it right to say that much of the evidence that
has been given to the Commission has been marked
confidential and we believe that many of the witnesses
have given evidence under the impression that their
statements would not be published. In these circum
stances, we think that it would be a breach of confidence
if the evidence contained in the appendix to this report
were made public.
180. In conclusion we desire to say that we have,
throughout our inquiry, been pressed by the consideration
that time was of the essence of the matter, that substance
was more important than form, and that it was expedient
that we should formulate our conclusions as early as
possible. In these circumstances, we have not thought
it desirable to keep back the report to remove defects in
form which, if time had been available, might have been
remedied by more careful revision.
We have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
W. H. VINCENT.
A. H. BINGLEY.
E. A. RIDSDALE.
ADDENDUM.
On my arrival at Bombay on April 4th, I was asked to
join this Commission by His Excellency Lord Hardinge,
who was leaving India that day. I consented and left for
Basra on April 9th, where, on arrival, I at once got in touch
with my colleagues. 1 found that they had been in Meso
potamia for a month, and that acting upon an earlier and
restricted reference thay had already examined over 130
witnesses, and travelled by river to the firing line and back
again in order to acquaint themselves at first hand with
the medical conditions.
After discussion with them, since the value of the report
must be diminished by every day’s delay in its issue, we
agreed to consider the work continuous, I joining in the
inquiry at the point at which they were, and reading up at
my leisure, and investigating when necessary, the evidence
which they had already accumulated.
It follows from this that the great bulk of the very heavy
work of detail involved in this investigation, and apparent
in the appendix, has been the labour of my colleagues.
E. A. RIDSDALE.
ANNEXURE 1.
(Referred to on page 1.)
No. H.-2418, dated Delhi, March 31st, 1916
From —Major-General B. Holloway, C.I.E., Secretary
to the Government of India, Army Department.
To—The Hon. Sir William Vincent, Knt., I.C.S.
With reference to the correspondence ending with my
telegram No. H.-2407, dated March 30th, 1916, I am to
say that it has been decided that the commission to which
you have been appointed will assemble under the orders
of the Government of India.
2. I am directed therefore to forward revised orders
and terms of reference for the commission appointed
for the purpose of investigating and reporting upon the
arrangements for dealing with the wounded and sick in
Mesopotamia in substitution of the orders and terms of
reference sent to you under letter No. 41551, dated
March 2nd, 1916, from the Chief of the General Staff.
Copy of the foregoing is forwarded to:—
Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
Major-General A. H. Bingley, C.B., C.I.E.
Mr. E. A. Ridsdale.
ORDERS FOR THE HON. SIR WILLIAM VINCENT,
Knt., I.C.S., MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. BINGLEY,
C.B., C.I.E., AND Mr. E. A. RIDSDALE.
1. The Government of India have appointed you
Commissioners for the purpose of investigating and
reporting upon the arrangements for dealing with the
wounded and sick in Mesopotamia, in accordance with
the terms of reference attached.
2. You will proceed to Basra, where you will report
to the General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” who
will give you every facility in the execution of your
duties.
3. Copies of all war diaries, reports, despatches, books
and maps, and other information that you may require,
will be provided both by Army Headquarters and General
Officer Commanding, Force “ D.”
4. You are entitled to call and examine any witness
whose evidence you consider necessary.
5. All communications, including your report, will be
addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India,
Army Department, Simla.
B. HOLLOW 7 AY, Major-General,
Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department.
Delhi.