'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎78v] (156/248)

154
pared to accept either of these contentions as correct.
There was no doubt a shortage of medical personnel and
some delay in treating such a large number of wounded,
but much of the discomfort and suffering was of a kind
that is unavoidable after a severe action. The arrange
ments made were well-considered and methodical, and
considering the difficulties worked well, every effort
being made to expedite the journey from Shaiba to
Basra and to render the patients as comfortable as
possible. We do not doubt that certain of the Turkish
prisoners arrived at Basra in a bad state, but we cannot
accept the view that this was caused by any neglect on
the part of the British medical officers. We think that
more probably their condition was due to the time which
elapsed between the date on which they were wounded
and the date on which they were captured, and to the
inefficiency and callousness of the Turkish doctors, of
which we have had ample evidence in the course of our
enquiry. The evidence indeed indicates that throughout
the campaign the Turkish wounded have been treated
by our officers with the same consideration as our own.
124. At this period of the campaign the hospitals at
Basra were crowded ; but, as we have already stated in
a previous part of this report, we are satisfied that the
authorities made every effort, in spite of the large number
of casualties, to treat their patients promptly and effec
tively. On the whole we think that in very unfavourable
circumstances the medical arrangements during this phase
were satisfactory.
125. Battle of Nasariyth .—During the operations of
General Gorringe up the Euphrates, the medical arrange
ments were in our opinion deficient. The medical units
which accompanied the force did not include either
clearing or stationary hospitals, and were insufficient to
deal promptly or satisfactorily with the large numbers of
sick and wounded. In the second place, no river hospital
steamer accompanied the force, with the result that after
the first engagement at Gurma Safha the wounded had
to be accommodated on the “ Mejidieh ” which was
at that time being used as a gun boat, and was in action
and under shell fire. Less suitable accommodation for
sick and wounded it would be difficult to conceive,
although this was not the first time that this steamer had
served this double purpose. The wounded were shortly
afterwards evacuated in an ordinary river steamer to
Basra. After the action of July 14th the wounded were
collected successfully, though with great difficulty, by
nightfall. They were accommodated in a field ambulance
and were evacuated the next day, in a convoy, in charge
of a medical officer. The evidence as to the number of
patients in this convoy is not very consistent, but we have
definite proof that the available staff could not cope with
the work, that many of the wounds became septic, and
that a certain number of the patients did not receive
sufficient attention. The evidence of the officers at the
base, who received the patients from Xasariyeh, also
supports this statement; indeed it has been freely said
that many of the sick who arrived from these operations
up the Euphrates came to the hospitals in a very bad
state. On July 24th conditions were still Averse. The
force by this time had been increased to three brigades
and the whole medical staff, according to the evidence,
was nine field ambulance sections, equipped to deal Avith
225 cases. During the action, the bearer sub-di\ r isions
of these ambulances were sent out to the front, and at
their headquarters two medical officers only were left,
witk either one or two medical subordinates, to treat all
the sick and wounded, numbering about 1,000. The
accommodation for the reception of the wounded Avas
insufficient, and it was not until the 25th that they were
all placed under shelter. There was, for some time, a
lack of food, and it was manifestly impossible for the avail
able staff to treat this number o! patients with proper
eare. There is a consensus of evidence that for some
time after this action the wounded underwent consider
able suffering and discomfort. As soon as the troops
occupied Nasariyeh, the patients were removed there.
Conditions immediately improved, and the arrangements
for the comfort of patients were better organised ; but
we feel bound to say that, prior to this the arrangements
were inadequate We are satisfied that the officers on the
spot did all that was possible to prevent suffering and to
promote the comfort of their patients, but the fact is that
the medical staff, the accommodation, and the supply of
comforts, were alike insufficient. The wounded in this
action were evacuated to the base in ordinary river
steamers, Avith improvised medical personnel and equip
ment. The general objection to this use of these steamers
has already been explained, and the evidence as to the
condition of many of the patients, when they reached
Basra, supports our criticism on the point.
126. There Avas no serious engagement on the Euphrates
betAveen July and February, and the medical staff at
Nasariyeh, from July, 1915, onward, dealt mainly Avith
medical cases.only. These were accommodated in field
ambulances, and the position here again illustrates the
dislocation, with its corollary of discomfort to the patients,
which the Avant of a sufficient number of hospitals in
Mesopotamia has entailed. When Ave visited Nasariyeh
in April, Ave thought it right to address the Director of
Medical Services, Mesopotamia, on the necessity of sending
a stationary or at least a clearing hospital, to Nasariyeh.
We have been informed that orders for the despatch of a
stationary hospital have been issued, but on the occasion
of our visit the position Avas this, that if the force there had
been seriously engaged, the field ambulances would have
had not only to deal Avith the wounded in the field, but
also to provide personnel and equipment for their treat
ment in hospitals. We do not think that they could have
performed these double duties satisfactorily.
127. Since the Hammar Lake fell last year heliums have
been the only means for evacuating the sick and wounded
from Nasariyeh. As has already been stated, Ave found
it necessary to Avrite to the medical authorities on this .
subject, and Ave have reason to believe that in future a
riA r er hospital steamer Avill visit Nasariyeh at regular
intervals. We have already commented on the hardships
caused by the eAmcuation of the sick and wounded in
country boats. We need only say further, that it is a
matter for regret that it Avas not found possible to provide
some more suitable craft for this purpose. We are aware
that the difficulty of crossing the Hammar Lake in certain
seasons of the year is very great, but even accepting this,
we do not see why, at least beloAv the Hammar Lake,
some more suitable form of water transport should not
have been provided
128. Advance on Amara .— During the advance from
Kuma to Amara, the actual arrangements in the field
for the collection of the wounded were highly successful.
The medical units accompanied the force on heliums and
rafts, and as soon as the Turkish positions were captured,
some of these units established themselves on land and,
without delay, treated not only the British, but also the
Turkish wounded. For the collection of the wounded
from the different creeks, large covered-in mahailas of
light draught were specially prepared. The personnel Avas
•ufficient, and the equipment, which included some equip
ment captured from the enemy, was ample. The
casualties were not numerous and the collection and
treatment of the wounded was effected methodically and
Avell. For the evacuation of the Avounded, a river steamer
Avas fitted up Avith improvised beds and a supply of medical
stores and comforts. Though we consider that a properly
equipped hospital steamer was needed on this occasion,
AA r e think that the local arrangements made Avere the
best feasible. The great Avant at this time Avas ice. A
certain quantity was sent up twice a Aveek from Basra to
Kurna, but it was not sufficient for the needs of the sick,
many of Avhom were suffering from heat stroke.
129. When the force reached Ezra’s Tomb, though the
sick and wounded were at once accommodated in the
coolest place possible, the discomfort and suffering caused
by the want of ice continued and was the more felt owing
to the prevalence of heat stroke, some cases of Avhich
proved fatal. It is, in our opinion, a matter for regret
that steps were not taken to ensure a sufficient supply of
ice being provided for the sick. There Avas also a deficiency
in supplies of milk, beef essence and other medical comforts.
At Amarah which was reached on June 4th, the condition
of affairs was Avorse. No clearing hospital accompanied
the force, and the sick had all to be accommodated in
field ambulances which Avere much overcrowded. Ice
was not procurable until June 21st, and, according to the
evidence before us, the supply shortly afterwards failed.
There was, if we are to accept the evidence gWen to us,
a shortage of drugs, including castor oil, Epsom salts,
emetine and quinine, and the supply of medical comforts
'V