'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎74r] (147/248)

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difficulties experienced by the staff and administrative
services in Mesopotamia have been due to the inadequacy
of the river transport. We have been told, over and
over again, that owing to the shortage of steamers and
tugs of suitable draught and towing power, delays have
constantly occurred in carrying out important strategic
moves, in sending up reinforcements to the front, in
providing the supplies required for the maintenance of
the troops, in moving up medical units and their ambu
lance transport, and in sending up urgently needed
medical stores and equipment. The same cause has
delayed the despatch of comforts generously provided
by the Order of St. John and the various funds organised
in India, and by the Joint Committee of the Red Cross
Society and Order of St. John in England, to lessen the
hardships of the troops. It has also delayed the con
veyance up river of the building material and engineer
ing stores required for the construction of hospitals and
quarters for medical personnel at places on the line of
communications. The delays in providing the hospitals
at Amara with electric lights and fans, in sending up
disinfectors, water purifying apparatus, water carts and
soda water machines, as well as in establishing a field
force canteen where officers and men can purchase what
they require at a reasonable cost, must also be attributed
to the same reason. To this shortage also must be ascribed
the unnecessary differing caused to the wounded, through
delays in effecting their evacuation down river, after
the battle of Ctesiphon last year and the battles of
Shaikh Saad, the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. , and Umm-el-Hannah in January
last.
74. These views, which are supported by a mass of
evidence of the most convincing character, agree with
our own conclusions on the subject. We consider that
there has been a shortage of river craft ever since the
occupation of Kurna, and that despite the large number
of steamers and barges now employed on the rivers of
Mesopotamia the river transport at the disposal of the
General Officer Commanding has never been adequate,
and at times has been seriously deficient. Strenuous
efforts have been made by the military authorities in
India to remedy this defect, but though a large number
of steamers and barges have been sent out from time
to time, the additions to the river flotilla have not kept
pace either with the additions made to the force, or with
the increased demands for transport for the supplies,
ammunition, medical equipment, engineering and air
craft stores entailed by such additions, as well as by
the lengthening of the lines of communication. Thus,
though the average river tonnage available in November,
1915, was about 150 tons a day as compared with about
250 tons a day available in April, 1916, the deficit in
actual shipping requirements tended, until recently, to
increase rather than diminish.
75. When it was decided in November, 1914, to send
an expedition to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , the objective of the
force was Basra, and its role was to secure the mouth
of the Shatt-el-Arab and safeguard our interests in the
oil-fields east of the Karun. The force employed only
amounted to a division, and as its operations were at
first confined to the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, the
need for additional river transport was not felt. Supplies
could be brought up to Basra and even Kurna by sea
going ships, and the local resources in the way of river
shipping sufficed for the movement and maintenance of
the small forces which had to be detached occasionally
from headquarters. The policy of Government as regards
Mesopotamia was one of caution, and the plan of opera
tions prepared by the General Staff in India did not
provide for more than the occupation of Basra, the
country north of that place being, as we are informed,
outside the sphere of military intelligence for which
India is responsible. We mention this fact, as had an
advance on Bagdad been contemplated from the outset,
river transport of a suitable kind should, and no doubt
would, have been provided on a scale sufficient for the
number of troops which it was intended to employ.
76. Though the Turks were driven out of Basra, they
remained within striking distance of Kuma, and it
became evident early in 1915 that they were about to
advance from Amara on Ahwaz and from Nasariyeh
on Basra. With the prospect of having to detach forces
for operations on the Karun and Euphrates, Sir Arthur
Barrett, after consulting local experts, asked on January
4th for some steamers of the “ Mejidieh ” type, drawing
not more than 3 feet 6 inches. Knowing, however, that
this type was a special one, evolved by Messrs. Lynch
Brothers as the result of half a century’s experience of
the navigation of the Tigris, he added that any river
steamers obtainable in India or Burmah of 10 kncu speed
and not more than 4 feet 6 inches draught, capable of
carrying from 500 to 800 men and towing two lighters,
would satisfy his immediate requirements. The autho
rities in India met this demand with promptitude. By
May 20th seven paddle steamers of the type suggested
had reached Basra, and they were followed soon after
by four tugs and four launches. These vessels formed
the nucleus of the Government flotilla, consisting of the
“ P,” “ T,” “ L ” and “S ” classes of river craft, i.e., the
paddlers, tugs, launches and sternwheelers, which are
constantly referred to in the statements of witnesses.
77. Owing to the nature of the country and the dis
tribution of the population and political centres, any
operations against the Turks have to be made along
the Tigris, Euphrates or Karun, and in the absence of
railways the success of these operations depends on the
number and suitability of the steamers and barges
available. The river steamers at Sir John Nixon’s
disposal in the spring of 1915 were sufficient so long
as they were only required for the carriage of supplies ;
but when it became necessary, owing to the flooded state
of the country and the expansion of the theatre of opera
tions, to utilise them also for the conveyance of troops
and the evacuation of an increasing number of sick and
wounded, the shortage of shipping became apparent.
This shortage, moreover, was aggravated by the fact
that the steamers drawing 4 feet 6 inches, which Sir
Arthur Barrett had accepted as suitable, could, during
the low-water season, only be navigated with difficulty
through the narrows of the Tigris above Kurna, and not
at all on the Euphrates or Karun.
78. The navigation of the Tigris demands skill and
local knowledge. Some of its reaches are straight, others
are extraordinarily tortuous. Some are broad and others
so narrow that steamers can only pass each other w hen
one is moored to the bank. The difficulty of finding
vessels suitable for employment on this troublesome
waterway is very great, for the types evolved by Mes; rs.
Lynch Brothers have, we believe, no counterpart on
any other riVer in the East. The bends of the Tigris
are so sharp and the current so strong that the navigation
of vessels down stream is very difficult unless they are
fitted with independent paddles. Steamers are swept
from side to side and hurled against the bank. To
protect them and their paddle wheels, and at the same
time increase their carrying capacity, it is usual to attach
a barge each side. These barges must be built of iron,
which will dent on impact without breaking, as wooden
barges are crushed like eggshells. Similarly, very few
steamers are strong enough to bear the impact of the
barges which protect them from the banks, and only
steamers fitted with specially constructed cross stanchions
can be used to take the stress. Vessels like the Nile
and Thames steamers will not stand the pressure, and
can only be used in the straighter reaches above Amara.
A further complication is that steamers which can navi
gate the Tigris in flood, will not all go up river when
the water is low. We mention these details as a river is
generally regarded as an admirable line of communication,
offering special facilities for the maintenance of a force
and the evacuation of its sick and wounded. In the
case of the Tigris, however, these advantages are heavily
discounted by the local difficilties above mentioned.
79. Realising these difficulties, which we think were
imperfectly appreciated in India, feir John Nixon asked
on May 27th for six powerful tugs, each capable of towing
two large flats and with a draught not exceeding 3 feet
in working trim. His reasons for asking for these tugs,
and for reducing the draught limit from 4 feet 6 inches
to 3 feet, have already been stated; but they were
accepted in India only after much correspondence, and
finally the Marine authorities replied that no vessels
answering to the new specification were obtainable. The
lack of success in meeting his requirements did not,
however, make any real difference at the time to General
Nixon’s plans, for even if tugs of the type required had
been found, it would not have been possible to send
them across the Arabian Sea during the monsoon. Nor
would it have been possible to send them in pieces to