'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎69v] (138/248)

136
2*-
500 of the enemy being killed in their trenches. The
Sadanawiyah position, which constituted the enemy s
last line of defence, was captured in the afternoon, and
by 6.30 p m. the Turks were in full retreat across the
marshes. Xasariyeh was occupied without opposition
on the 25th. Our losses in these skilfully planned and
brilliantly executed operations amounted to 104 killed
and 429 wounded. Our captures consisted of over
1,000 prisoners and 17 guns.
19. No further oj>erations took place in the neighbour
hood of Nasariyeh until January 7th ,1916, when a mixed
force under Major-General Gorringe moved out 12 miles
north-west to Butaniyah, for the purpose of demonstrat
ing towards Shattra. It was hoped that the Turks
might be induced to weaken their force opposing General
Aylmer on the Tigris by detaching troops to guard the
lines of approach along the Shatt-el-Hai. Although this
demonstration failed to accomplish this, it succeeded in
attracting large numbers of hostile Arabs who might
otherwise have joined the Turkish forces round Kut.
20. Minor operations round Nasariyeh.—The fighting
round Nasariyeh at this time included three minor actions.
The first was an attack made on January 14th on a small
force by some 3,000 Arabs, between Butaniyah and
Suwaij, while General Gorringe was carrying out a personal
reconnaissance. It took the form of a rear-guard action
in which our troops fell back with great steadiness to their
camp. The Arab casualties numbered close on 200,
our own amounting to 4 killed and 36 wounded and
missing. The next action took place on February 7th,
during the withdrawal of the force from Butaniyah to
Nasariyeh. Our troops, under the command of Brigadier-
General E. C. Tidswell, were attacked by some 5,000
Arabs. As the column fell back, the enemy was rein
forced by other Arabs from the villages along the line of
retirement with the result that it was attacked in flank
as well as in rear. The enemy’s losses were heavy and
amounted to about 1,000. Our casualties numbered 3/3,
of whom 148 were killed. To punish certain Arabs who
had previously been friendly, but who had treacherously
turned on our troops during their retirement, a column
was sent out by Brigadier-General H. T. Brooking before
dawn on February 9th to surprise, attack and destroy
their villages. This was carried out very successfully
and with trifling losses.
PHASE III.
21. While General Gorringe was driving the enemy away
from Nasariyeh, Turkish forces were concentrating under
Nur-ud-din Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. at Kut-el-Amara, a place of great
strategic importance. This place accordingly became
our principal objective.
22. Owing to shortage of river steamers and the difficul
ties of navigation during the low-water season, the transfer
from the Euphrates of the troops and guns which were
required on the Tigris, proved a slow process. The con
centration of the force which consisted of the 6th Cavalry
Brigade and the 6th Division reinforced by various units,
the whole under the command of Major-General
Townshend, was not completed until September 12th
when it moved forward by march route from Ali-el-Gharbi
along the river bank, accompanied by its shipping.
Sannaiyat was reached on the 15th and there a halt was
made until the 25th. Intense heat prevailed with a
temperature varying from 110 to 116 degrees in the shade.
23. Battle of Es Sinn or Kut-el-Amara.—Kur-ud-din
Pasha’s army was found to be occupying an entrenched
position astride the Tigris at Es Sinn, some 8 miles from
where our troops were then encamped. The position was
some 12 miles in extent and consisted of skilfully concealed
entrenchments commanding ground which was absolutely
flat and devoid of cover. General Townshend decided
to turn the enemy’s left and so threaten his line of retreat
to Baghdad. At the same time, in order to deceive
Nur-ud-din Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. as to the direction of the real attack,
preparations were made with the object of giving the
impression that the principal attack would be on the
right bank against the southern portion of the enemy s
position This ruse proved completely successful. The
16th and 17th Infantry Brigades, under Brigadier-General
Delamain, made a night march round the Turkish left
flank, while the 18th Infantry Brigade, under Major-
General Fry, held the enemy in front. By 2 p.m. on
September 28th the greater portion of the enemy’s
northern defences were in our hands, and the remainder
were evacuated by him during the night. A pursuit was
organised on the‘29th, and the cavalry came into touch
with the Turks on October 1st, but had to wait for the
support of the infantry which was coming up in steamers,
and the progress of the latter was unfortunately delayed
by difficulties of navigation. It was not till the 5th that
the column reached Azizieh, and by then the enemy had
retired into his defensive position at Ctesiphon where he
was reinforced.
24. The Turks lost some 4,000 men in this battle, of
whom 1,153 fell into our hands. They also lost 14 guns.
Our casualties amounted to 94 killed and 1,113 wounded.
The battle of Kut-el-Amara, or Es Sinn, as it is sometimes
called, secured for us the whole of the Basra vilayat.
It was the crowning point of an almost unbroken record of
successes. The strength of the enemy’s defences, the
improved quality of his troops and the incon\ enience
caused by shortage of land and river transport had, by
this time, become very apparent. Difficulties in regard
to the collection and evacuation of the wounded owing to
a higher percentage of losses, the inadequacy of the medical
services, and the growing length of the line of communica
tion had also come prominently to notice, thus fore
shadowing the greater difficulties which were to be experi
enced in later battles.
25. The next six weeks, which were utilised by the
Turks in bringing down additional troops from Mosul,
were spent by General Townshend in bringing up supplies,
transport and reinforcements from Basra, preparatory to
a further advance as soon as orders on the subject were
received. These preliminary measures were again de
layed by the shortage of steamers and the difficulty of
navigation during the low-water season. The advance
was recommenced on November 19th, and by the 21st
the force, with its shipping, was concentrated on the
left bank of the Tigris at Laj. A reconnaissance of the
enemy’s position showed that his defences lay astride
the Tigris covering the approaches to Baghdad which is
situated some 18 miles to the north-west. They had been
under construction for some months, and consisted of an
extensive system of entrenchments forming two main
positions. Close to the Jigris on the left bank and
midway between the two defensive lines which were
about two miles apart, was the Arch of Ctesiphon a
prominent landmark frequently referred to in the state
ments of witnesses.
26. Battle of Ctesiphon.—General Townshend, after a
night march from Laj, attacked the Turkish position on
the morning of the 22 nd at its centre and on its north
east flank. His objective at the centre was a large
redoubt referred to by witnesses and described in operation
orders as the “ V. P.,” *.e., “ the Vital Point.” There
Avas severe fighting throughout the day resulting in the
capture of the first position and more than 1,300 prisoners.
Our troops then penetrated to the second position, cap
turing 8 guns, and established themselves in the enemy’s
trenches. Here they were subjected to heavy counter
attacks by fresh troops.- Shortly before nightfall it was
found necessary, owing to diminished numbeis, to order
the withdrawal of our troop to the first position which
they had captured earlier in the day. November 23rd
■was spent in reorganising the force and in collecting the
wounded. Chving to heavy losses, General ToAvnshend
deemed it inadvisable to renew the offensive. The Turks
made heavy attacks all along the line during the night,
but Avere everywhere repulsed. On the 24th and 25th
the Avounded and prisoners were evacuated to Laj Avhere
steamers Avere Avaiting to receiAe them, and General
ToAvnshend, under cover of an offensive movement, then
shortened his line so as to bring his flank nearer the river.
The enemy received numerous reinforcements on the 25th
and on the afternoon of that day large columns Avere seen
moving inland as if to turn the British right flank, Avhile
hostile cavalry threatened its rear.
27. Finding himself faced by superior forces and short
of supplies, General ToAvnshend withdreAV to Laj under
cover of darkness and remained there during the 26th.
Laj, hoAvever, did not lend itself to defence, so he fell
back during the night of the 27th to Azizieh. On the
morning of the 30th, continuing his retirement, he halted
at Umm-al-Tubal, where he had to remain, as several of
his steamers were aground. The lurks attacked in great
rv
4