'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎61r] (121/248)

PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
119
B. Recommendations.
and Sir William Babtie, “ they are so bad that I think it would be necessary to reform
them ah initio.” The new Indian hospitals should be staffed by enlisted personnel
of all ranks, and should be used for building up trained reserves of menial establish
ments in peace time.
(/) All deficiencies usually allowed to prevail in peace-t'me in the mobilisation
equipment of general hospitals should be made good. Sir W. Babtie told us that of
the general hospitals in India. “ Twelve were supposed to be mobilisable, but only
four were complete in all the different Departments of supply.” All such equipment
should be stored and in readiness, and inspected, as is done now, in the case of field
ambulances, casualty clearing hospitals and stationary hospitals.
(g) Base Depots of Medical Stores should be reintroduced into the Indian Field
Service organisation, and kept ready for mobilisation.
(h) At the outset of every campaign there should be provided a separate superior
sanitary organisation and staff charged with the arrangements for preserving and
safeguarding the health of the fighting troops, and responsible to the Principal Medical
Officer of the force, but otherwise entirely separate from the organisation for the care
of the sick and wounded. This implies a formation in peace-time of an adequate reserve
of sanitary officers, enlisting in it, if necessary, the services of specialists in civil
employment.
(i) The Field Service Ration should receive very careful reconsideration and altera
tion in the light of experience in Mesopotamia. This especially applies to the rations
for Indian troops. The War Office Sanitary Committee found that even, “ the improved
ration ” sanctioned as late as October last was deficient in many respects.
36. The above are only some of the defects revealed by our investigations, but they
are sufficient to prove the necessity for an urgent, and thorough reform by the Indian
Government of the whole system, upon which their medical services are based, and
under which they are controlled. Sir Alfred Keogh, whose administration at the War
Office as Director-General Army Medical Services has been very successful during this
war, at the conclusion of his evidence made the following very strong statement:—
“ I have no hesitation whatever in saying that the medical arrangements connected with the Army in
India have been for years and years most disgraceful. I say that with a full sense of responsibility. I have
served many years in India. I have not been there for some time now, but in my opinion things are not better
than they were. Anything more disgraceful than the carelessness and want of attention with regard to the
sick soldier in India it is impossible to imagine.”
37. Our colleague, Commander Wedgwood, has written a dissentient Report. It
contains much that is interesting and, in many important points, it differs from our own
Report rather in emphasis than in substance. Thus, for example, in Part XL, paragraphs
40-41 of our Report we have called attention to the Indian Government’s lack of alacrity
in mobilising the resources of India for the assistance of the Empire in the war, a feature
upon which Commander Wedgwood lays so much stress in his Report. But we do not
think the evidence before us justifies attaching to Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff
alone the blame for the mistakes and shortcomings connected with the Mesopotamia
Expedition. We have given reasons for a wider, and, in our judgment, a more equitable
apportionment of responsibility.
38. In our investigations we have been confronted by an enormous mass of written
evidence. Sir Beauchamp Duff supported his oral evidence by over forty Blue-books and
other documents drawn up by the Headquarters Staff in India. They were admirably edited
and annotated. But this mass of written evidence, as well as the many other documents