'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎59r] (117/248)

PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
115
A. Findings and Conclusions.
(d) A more severe censure must be passed upon the Commander-in-Chief, for not
only did he, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India, fail closely to superintend the
adequacy of medical provision in Mesopotamia, but he declined for a considerable
time, until ultimately forced by the superior authority of the Viceroy, to give credence
to rumours which proved to be true, and failed to take the measures, which a
subsequent experience shows would have saved the wounded from avoidable suffering.
20. There has been misuse of official reticence as to medical defects and the sufferings
of the sick and wounded.
21. While the protective and sanitary work of the Medical Administration has in certain
directions and at some periods (notably under Colonel Hehir) been commendable, yet there
has not been generally sufficient promptitude in taking the precautions dictated by modern
science for the protection of the troops against disease.
22. Throughout the campaign (with insignificant exceptions) the executive and regi
mental medical officers and personnel have devoted themselves with unremitting kindness,
zeal and industry to the care of the sick and wounded with such means as were at their
disposal.
Indian Frontier and Internal Troubles.
23. In the information laid before us by high authorities as to the military require
ments of India, there was constant reference made to the ever-present risk of invasion
on the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. and the danger of simultaneous internal disturbance. We
are satisfied of the reality of such dangers and of the necessity of keeping mobilised a large
force on this frontier. There is little doubt that on more than one occasion since the out
break of war the Indian Government passed through a period of grave anxiety, which they
successfully surmounted. The preoccupation caused by this anxiety must not be forgotten
in blaming the Indian Government for the inefficiency of the management of the
Mesopotamian campaign.
General Results of the Expedition.
24. The character of the Instructions given to us as a Commission and the date of
our appointment compelled us to devote a large proportion of our time and attention to
that limited period of the campaign in Mesopotamia in which reverses were experienced by
our troops. We have probed to the best of our ability the causes of these failures in order
to make suggestions for their remedy and removal. Though we have spent so large a
portion of our time in looking into a period of reverses, this should not overlay A transparent or translucent sheet designed to be placed over a map to show additional information. or obliterate
the fact that the success of the campaign has, as a whole, been remarkable. The operations
have lasted over 2\ years, and, with the exception of a few months during which there was
a serious setback, the war has been an unbroken success. Up to the date of the advance
to Baghdad, in November, 1915, continuous victory had been achieved by the Expedition
ary Force. During the last few months the river transport has been increased, port
facilities improved, the force has been re-organised and adequately equipped for the task
before it, and it has resumed its career of victory. We are of opinion—reviewing the opera
tions as a whole—that it may now be truly asserted that in the many parts of the world in
which the Allied Forces have been engaged, no more substantial results or more solid vic
tories have been achieved than those won by the gallantry of the British and Indian Armies
on the stricken plains of Mesopotamia.
Moral of Troops.
25. Our investigations show that what is in default is not the fighting capacity and
efficiency of the combatant forces of the Indian Army, but the system of military adminis
tration in control of that Army. Rarely, if ever, have greater courage or pertinacity been
shown by British and Indian troops than is recorded in the operations of the Expeditionary
Force both during their successes and reverses. They had to operate under unfavourable
conditions of climate, weather, flooded terrain insufficient supplies and wholly inadequate
transport, and they were surrounded by a hostile and marauding population. In out judg
ment, no praise can be too high for the gallantry and spirit evinced by the officers and men of
all ranks of the British and Indian Armies under this accumulation of difficulties. It is
most desirable that the governing machinery of the Indian Army should be so reformed
as to enable it to be a help and not a drag on the fighting capacity of the armies it controls.
^0 48—176) P 2