'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎51v] (102/248)

TOO PART XL—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.
B. Faulty Organisation of Indian Military Administration.
of Army administration ; it is only an instrument for the co-ordination of efficiency and
economy, and for the prevention of waste and extravagance. If, by undue expansion,
it fails to achieve these ends, it tends to promote the very administrative evils it was
intended to counteract.
13. The removal of the seat of Government from Calcutta to Delhi greatly diminished,
if it did not destroy, the contact between high officialdom and the commercial and business
elements of India. At Delhi almost the entire European population is official and con
nected with Government departments. A few years back each Presidency The name given to each of the three divisions of the territory of the East India Company, and later the British Raj, on the Indian subcontinent. had a separate
Commander-in-Chief and a separate army, and their Headquarter Staffs were permanently
located in the capitals of the respective Presidencies. These armies have all now been
amalgamated, and their separate commands and staffs abolished.
14. It will thus be seen how great has become the centralisation of authority in one
man’s hands. Sir Edmund Barrow, the Senior General on the Indian List and Military
Secretary at the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , and an officer of quite exceptional experience, expressed the
view that the Commander-in-Chief is now trying to perform the work of six men, and he
further added that the old duties of the Commander-in-Chief have completely fallen into
■ abevancc. The late Commander-in-Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff, did not agree in this
opinion. He contended that in times of peace one man could discharge the functions
of both offices, especially if he were allowed a Deputy Chief of the Staff. But he admitted
that there was more than one man could do in time of war. that during the war he had been
able to give no time to the special work of Commander-in-Chief, and that the location of
the Mil itary department at Simla cut off the Commander-in-Chief in war time from contact
I with the combatant services.
15. Simla, as is well known, is a hill-top in the Himalayas on the borders of Nepal.
Its remoteness from great towns and great cantonments of India and its inaccessibility,
render it singularly unsuitable for the residence, during the greater part of the year, of
the one high official who has to discharge this unique mass of military responsibilities.
When, however, in addition to his normal dual work, he is also in charge of an oversea
expedition, his disconnection from the actualities of fighting and his want of contact with
those who return to and from the stricken field, become a serious impediment to the know
ledgeable discharge of this war work.
Sir Percy Lake was for some time Chief of the General Staff at Simla, and was in
constant personal communication with the Commander-in-Chief. He was sent to Mesopo
tamia in January, 1916, to take Sir John Nixon’s place, whose health had broken down.
If there was anyone in India who from his daily work and communications might have
been expected to have appreciated the difficulties confronting an army in Mesopotamia,
\ it should have been Sir Percy Lake. In his evidence before us he frankly admitted that
in no sense did he fully realise the nature of the obstacles to be overcome, or the magnitude
of the exertions necessary to enable them to be surmounted, until he took over the command
in that country.
16. The great mass of the troops, stores, and reinforcements for Mesopotamia embarked
at Bombay, and at the same port the disembarkation of the huge number of sick and
wounded returning from that country took place. Sir Beauchamp Duff as Commander-
in-Chief never visited that port during the crisis of the war, nor has any permanent member
of the Headquarter Staff been there stationed. Everything to be done was attempted
from Simla. Requisitions and indents for stores, applications for leave, and other matters,
all of which could have been easily settled in Bombay, had to go to Simla before they were
complied with. The views and opinions of those returning sick or wounded as to the
conduct and wants of the expedition do not seem to have filtered through to Simla until
s quite late in the campaign. Civilians and non-officials in Bombay knew more of what was
\ going on in Mesopotamia than the Headquarter Staff in Simla. Ignorance at Head
quarters produced scepticism, and this scepticism was supported by the very optimistic
reports officially received from Basra. One witness who went from Basra straight to
Delhi or Simla has informed us of the incredulity with which his statements were received,
and how official despatches were brought out of portfolios which contradicted what he
| himself had seen and knew.
17. Lord Hardinge, in one of his letters to the Secretary of State to which we have
already alluded, writes on the 18th February, 1916 : “I may mention here that I have