'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎48r] (95/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
03
F. Supplementary.
Major R. M. Carter, IM.S.
119. Before we leave this part of our report we wish to express our appreciation of
the evidence given and the work done by Major R. M. Carter, I.M.S. He by his persistence
brought to the notice of his superiors the terrible condition of the wounded when they
arrived at Basra after Ctesiphon, and in other ways he revealed shortcomings which might
have been ignored and left unremedied. His sense of duty seems to be most commendable,
and he was fertile and resourceful in suggesting remedies.
G. Medical Findings and Recommendations.
Findings. Findings.
We find that:—
120. The medical provision for the Mesopotamia Campaign was from the beginning
insufficient; by reason of the continuance of this insufficiency there was a lamentable
breakdown in the care of the sick and wounded after the battle of Ctesiphon and after the
battles in January, 1916 ; there was amelioration in March and April, 1916 ; but that
since then the improvement has been continual, until it is reasonable to hope that now the
medical provision is satisfactory.
121. The defects of medical provision caused avoidable suffering to the sick and
wounded, and during the breakdown in the winter of 1915-16 this suffering was most
lamentably severe.
122. The deficiencies, which were the main causes of the avoidable suffering of the
sick and wounded, were in the provision of the following :—
(a) River hospital steamers.
(b) Medical personnel.
(c) River transport.
(d) Ambulance land transport.
To these fifth and sixth main causes may be added in respect to the operations in
January, 1916 :—
(e) The absence of the medical and supply establishments of the 7th Division.
(/) The premature efforts to relieve Kut in consequence of the erroneous estimate
of supplies in that place.
123. As to personal responsibility, the Vincent-Bingley Commission found—
That a grave responsibility for that part of the suffering which resulted from avoidable circumstances
rests with the Senior Medical Officer of the Force, Surgeon-General G. H. Hathaway, and with General Sir
John Nixon, the General Officer Commanding the Force, from April 9th, 1915, to January 19th, 1916. General
Hathaway did not represent with sufficient promptitude and force the needs of the services for which he was
responsible, and in particular failed to urge the necessity for adequate and suitable transport for the sick and
wounded with that insistency which the situation demanded. General Nixon did not, in our opinion, appreciate
the conditions which would necessarily arise if provision for the sick and wounded of his force were not made
on a more liberal scale.
We endorse the finding as regards Surgeon-General Hathaway, who in our judgment
showed himself unfit for the high administrative office which he held. We may add,
however, as regards River and Land Transport, that, while it was the duty of Surgeon-
General Hathaway to urge its necessity, it was actually the duty of the Quartermaster-
General’s Department and Sir John Nixon’s staff to see that it was provided.
So far as Sir John Nixon is concerned, however, we think that he was throughout
solicitous as to the condition of the wounded. The main mistake he made was to rely
too absolutely on the statements made to him by his Deputy Director of Medical Service,
Surgeon-General Hathaway ; to that extent he may be blamed, but he stands, so far as
responsibility is concerned, in a very different position from that occupied by Surgeon-
General Hathaway.
124. The officer directly responsible for the deficiencies of medical provision in Meso
potamia is, however, the Director of Medical Services, India. This appointment was held
at the beginning of the war by Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie, who held the
office between March, 1914, and June, 1915, but was away from India for six weeks
in February and March, 1915. He was succeeded by Surgeon-General J. G. MacNeece
on July 8th, 1915, and the latter proceeded home on sick leave on April 15th, 1916.
Sir William Babtie in his evidence before us inapressed us as an officer of ability and
knowledge, but we do not think that he brought these qualities sufficiently to bear