'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎41v] (82/248)

80
PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
D. The Misuse of Reticence.
also seen a later document dated February 16th from Surgeon-General Hathaway. In
this latter document, which was presented to the Indian Government, occurs the following
statement:—
Shaikh Saad. The Meerut Stationary Hospital is under canvas here, under Major Goodbody, I.M S.,
in excellent order, accommodating 607 cases, including 19 British ; 277 of these are suffering from dysentery
of a mild type. This hospital is worked in a thoroughly efficient manner.
This is the only official reference Surgeon-General Hathaway made to his superior
concerning Shaikh Saad Camp. Amongst the horrors connected with the medical break
down, the condition of this camp up to January 18th, takes a foremost place. It is thus
described by the Vincent-Bingley Commission :—
After the occupation of Shaikh Saad on the 9th January, about 2,000 of the wounded were moved to a new
camp there, the remainder numbering 1,200 being left in a camp on the left bank of the river at Musandaq in
charge of a small medical staff. The condition of the camps at Musandaq and Shaikh Saad have been described
to us by various witnesses, and we are constrained to find that the arrangements for the accommodation and
treatment of the wounded there were very defective The medical staff was so small that the wounds of many
remained undressed for some days. The camps w^ere in a very insanitary condition. The supply of surgical
•tores and appliances ran short, and there was practically no subordinate staff to see to the welfare of the patient*.
The suffering and discomfort endured by the unfortunate wounded in these camps were very great, and even
up to the 18th January, when the Meerut Stationary Hospital took over charge at Shaikh Saad, this condition
of affairs continued there. The Officer Commanding this hospital describes the condition of that camp in the
following words :—“ On arrival here we found about 195 British and 800 Indian sick and wounded in an irregular
camp situated on filthy muddy ground behind the village. . . . There was one Indian temporary I.M.S. Officer in
charge of the Indians and he was ill. He had two sub-assistant surgeons and some of the personnel of an im
provised cavalry field ambulance to help him. He had no dressings left, and many cases still had on the first
field dressings which had been applied on the battlefield. About 200 of the patients had dysentery, and there
were no proper latrine arrangements. The state of the camp was indescribable. Near the middle of the hos
pital tents was a pile of bags of atta, etc., mostly ruined by the rain, which I was told represented 10 days’
rations.”
72. This appalling state of things continued during Surgeon-General MacNeece’s stay at
Basra. Apparently not a word was said to him by Surgeon-General Hathaway as regards
this condition of things. Surgeon-General Hathaway took the opportunity afforded him
by the enormous improvement which Major Goodbody with the Meerut Stationary
Hospital effected in the camp, and attempted to utilise it to cover up the shocking state of
things which had previously prevailed. Unless the Vincent-Bingley Commission had
reported, the state of this camp during the greater part of January would never have been
known, and it is impossible to acquit Surgeon-General Hathaway of keeping back the
unpleasant facts connected with this camp from the knowledge of the Indian Government.
Conduct of Surgeon-General Hathaway.
73. In connection with the withholding of information from Headquarters, we must
explain that a very important medium of communication between the chief medical
officer in Mesopotamia, and the Director of Medical Services in India was afforded by the
demi-official letters which it was customary for the former to send the latter at frequent
intervals. These communications were very regularly resorted to by Colonel Hehir, the
principal medical officer in Mesopotamia up to April, 1915. But Surgeon-General Hathaway
did not make proper use either of this means, or of more formal reports, for the purpose of
keeping the D.M.S. in India au courant with the situation. In contemporary letters which
have been submitted to us, and in his evidence before us Surgeon-General MacNeece com
plained several times of the manner in which he was kept in the dark by Surgeon-General
Hathaway as to the medical needs and difficulties of the Mesopotamian Expedition.
74. Indeed, in our opinion, Surgeon-General Hathaway has throughout the campaign
been the chief offender in the policy of suppressing the unpleasant. He failed to inform the
D.M.S. in India of the often deplorable conditions of the hospitals at Amara and at Orah.
He sent in reports as to the rations of the troops which induced India to believe that a
plentiful supply of vegetables, fresh, meat, etc., was available. We have not seen a single
report by Surgeon-General Hathaway emphasizing the dangers of the existing inadequate
methods of water-purification. In a formal report to the D.M.S. in the middle of February,
1916, he wrote : “ All water for drinking and cooking purposes is of course got from the river.
. . . This water is absolutely safe, the only precaution being necessary is the sedimen
tation of it as above referred to. The ‘ Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. ’ water is precisely the Tigris water and
correspondingly safe.” And he had previously referred to some defects in the process