'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎39r] (77/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
75
D. The Misuse of Reticence.
extracts from the evidence given to us by a witness, who was Surgical-Specialist at Colaba
Hospital, between February, 1915, and August, 1916 :—
When I took over the surgical wards on March 1st, 1915, from an officer of the I.M.S. there were some
twenty wounded officers and men in the hospital, which was, at that time, quite unprepared for the reception
of acute surgical cases from overseas. The equipment of wards and operating theatre was quite inadequate.
There was no X-ray installation. In fact, no apparent preparations had been made for establishment of the
hospital as an overseas base, although the Mesopotamian Campaign had been in existence for several months.
No fresh batch of wounded arrived until May 10th, 1915, when those from the Shaiba engagement were
admitted. On this date there was still a complete Jack of preparation for the reception of wounded.
“ There was a serious deficiency in ward equipment. During most of the time patients suffered from
lack of sufficient air-beds, water-beds, ring pillows, and their treatment was hindered by lack of splints and
other surgical apparatus, and by the impossibility of obtaining these necessaries in time to be of use.”
“ There was a serious shortage of medical personnel during the twelve months commencing March, 1915.
This necessarily affected the care of the patients. . . . During the emergency in August, 1915, I was
frequently obliged to perform operations in the wards, and to give the anaesthetic myself, in order to get
through the work each day.”
“ The shortage of the nursing staff was a serious hindrance to the care of the patients during all of the most
important periods. . . . There is no doubt that the patients suffered from this cause, and that the nurses
were at all times overworked between February, 1915, and April, 1916. The difficulty was overcome as
far as possible by the splendid service of those who were available The inadequacy of the
establishment of orderlies was a source of perpetual worry and inefficiency in carrying out the work. . . .
I cannot condemn too strongly the behaviour of whoever was responsible for the disgraceful lack of ]
efficient X-ray apparatus, when this was urgently needed. I have good reason to fully realise the trouble
due to this deficiency, as it affected my work considerably. In February, 1915, there was no X-rfiy apparatus
in the hospital. The wounded from Shaiba were radiographed by the Divisional Specialist in Electrical
Science (Capt. Stephen, R.A.M.C.), who brought his field apparatus from Divisional Headquarters
at Foona, and took it back there by order some days later. Capt. Stephen was, however, transferred
to Bombay with his apparatus in June, 1915. There was no X-ray room, so a small ward was used as
a makeshift, and here Capt. Stephen carried on this important work as best he could, with an apparatus that
any modern hospital would have refused to contain.”
The Captain Stephen referred to, himself stated in evidence before the Vincent-
Bingley Commission, that many patients were not X-rayed, because of the inefficiency of
the apparatus, and that although he had asked for a proper installation in July, 1915,
no order for it had been sent to the makers by .March, 1916. He had further been debarred
from obtaining “ tubes ” from London, and although an insufficient number of inefficient
tubes was ultimately supplied to him in India, he was informed by the Superintendent
of the X-Ray Institute, Deh-Ra-Dun, that he was not entitled to them because they
had not been indented for in 1914.
All these statements (with one exception) refer specifically to the date of
Sir William Babtie’s report or to the months immediately preceding it, and they there
fore constitute a serious impeachment of that report.
55. With regard to conditions in the hospital, prior to Sir William Babtie’s report,
we have also the evidence of the Viceroy himself, who visited it in February, 1915. Lord
Hardinge pointed out the deficiencies as regards electric light and fans, and told us that
the cooking was dirty, and the food indifferent. He added that he felt it “so hard that
the British soldiers and officers were so indifferently treated.’’ As regards the state
of the hospital after Sir William Babtie’s visit, the Surgical Specialist before quoted,
informs us that in August (when the wounded arrived in a very bad condition after the
Nasariyeh fighting), and in December, 1915, the hospital became grossly overcrowded,
and was infested with vermin, while the shortage of personnel was accentuated rather
than diminished as promised in the Viceroy’s telegram. We have also the evidence of
Surgeon-General MacNeece, Sir William Babtie’s successor, who visited the hospital
early in July and considered it unsatisfactory. “ Officers were crowded and badly done,”
he says in a letter to Sir Alfred Keogh, “ and rank and file not much better,” and his
evidence before us confirms this description. He found it necessary to recommend improve
ments and alterations which involved considerable expenditure, although the calls likely
to be made at the hospital had not increased since Sir William Babtie’s inspection. The
evidence shows that the Staff did their best, but notwithstanding this it is clear that Sir
William Bab tie’s report was misleading as regards the adequacy of the Colaba Hospital
arrangements.
f First Battle of Kut..
56. Between September 26th-and 28th, 1915, in and about the first battle of Es Sinn
or Kut, General Townshend’s force sustained some 1,300 casualties. Owing to insuffi
ciency of Field Ambulances and personnel, a lack of wheeled transport and river steamer j,
(C 48-176) K 2