'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎38r] (75/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
73
C. Medical Administration of Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie.
River Hospital Steanvers
49. In his examination before us Sir William Babtie agreed that in a campaign of this
kind, if casualties on a considerable scale were certain and the only transport along the
river, the authorities on the spot ought to have pressed for special river hospital accom
modation. We are of the opinion that in such circumstances it, to a certain extent,
devolved upon Sir William Babtie himself to have suggested and asked for the provision
of such river hospital steamers. His defence for not doing so is, we gather, that he was
not aware that there was any intention of an extensive campaign up the rivers, and that
his preparations were made for a campaign limited to the conquest and retention of Basra
and the oil fields. He told us that he was not informed of Sir John Nixon’s instructions
and that “ if there had been a hint of Baghdad the arrangements would have had to be
absolutely put into the melting-pot.” He was also unable to recollect being told of the
actual advance to Amara. Subsequently, however, under cross-examination, he admitted
that he knew from hearsay that both Amara and Nasariyeh were necessary for the defence
of Basra and the oil-fields. It does not, therefore, appear to us that he can escape all
responsibility for not having suggested the provision of this necessity in what he knew
from the outset to be more or less a riverine campaign. The extent of his activities in
this direction was a suggestion of, or acquiescence in, a proposal made by a voluntary
association to provide and equip a hospital river barge. When this barge sank on its way
out to Mesopotamia, Sir William Babtie took no further steps in the matter beyond
offering one motor launch also provided by voluntary effort.
Land Transport
50. His attitude in regard to land transport for the wounded was hardly more satis
factory An East India Company trading post. . The only such special transport provided under the Indian organisation consisted
of stretchers, riding mules and ambulance tongas, which are vehicles drawn by bullocks.
When the equipment of the expedition was being considered tongas were ruled out by Sir
William Babtie and the staff at Simla as being unsuitable for the country and Colonel Hehir
was so informed. We have already dealt in a previous paragraph* with the inadequacy of
stretchers, and riding mules, the only land ambulance transport provided with the expedi
tion. It follows that army transport carts were the only vehicles available for the sick
and wounded where land transport was necessary. We have received an overwhelming
mass of evidence as to the inhumanity of using these carts for the wounded. Padding for
them was not always available. In some cases dead bodies were even used as cushions.
Even when padded they were cruel and dangerous for certain classes of 'wounded. All
this must have been well-known to Surgeon-General Babtie, or might have been easily
ascertained by enquiry or experiment. His only action in regard to developing a more
suitable vehicle than the bullock-tonga was to ask the Maharajah of Benares to provide a
special corps of pony tongas—none of which were, however, available in Mesopotamia till
long after Sir William Babtie had left India. In addition, he sent one private motor
ambulance to Basra in March and offered a second in April, which was curtly refused.
The reason for this refusal has never been satisfactorily explained to us. Motor cars
were used as ambulances just previously at Shaiba and subsequently both up the Karim
and the Tigris. But in any case an unexplained telegraphic refusal of a particular motor
cannot (any more than the failure of Colonel Hehir to ask for tongas after he had been told
that they were not being sent) be accepted as relieving Sir William Babtie of his responsi
bility for not providing wheeled ambulance transport. Knowing it was not provided he
does not seem to have even asked for any special report or made any special enquiries as
to how the expedition were managing without it. Like Colonel Hehir, so long as no evident
disaster or scandal arose, he was content to “ carry on ” with obviously insufficient equip
ment. Though the expedition must inevitably fight and push forward by land and by «
river, he provided no proper land or river transport for the sick and wounded. He was
content to leave developments in this respect to the haphazard efforts of private
benevolence, and he never pressed upon the Indian Government or the Quartermaster-
General the necessity for an organised effort to modernise its out-of-date ambulance vehicles.
51. Surgeon-General Babtie’s omissions in regard to the Mesopotamian Campaign are J
all the more remarkable because of his promptitude and firmness in pressing war-provisions
on the Indian Government which were necessary for the overseas expeditions generally.
Thus, on the outbreak of war, he urged the formation of a fleet of ocean hospital ships,
the construction of hospital trains, and the expansion of the Army Bearer Corps. It may
be that, as we have noticed in other phases of the expedition, Mesopotamia was in medical
(C 48—176)
* See para. 37 ante.
K