'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎34v] (68/248)

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PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
A. The Yincent-Bingley Report and its Principal Conclusions.
* See Part X., B and C.
Th’is refers to the state of things at the base at Basra. As regards the state of things
elsewhere we quote the following :—
On the river steamera and barges which are utilised both for the conveyance of troops and the sick, the
arrangements for the supply of good drinking water appear to us to be defective. On some of the vessel*
there are no water tanks. On some the tanks supplied are useless, and on many steamers and barges there
are no arrangements for purifying the drinking w^ater that is used by the troops. . . . Water supply arrange
ments at the actual front were also, until recently, far from satisfactory. The recent outbreak of cholera >8
attributed by sanitary experts to the failure to supply the troops with a sufficient amount of purified drinking
water.
The Commissioners state, however, that the failure to supply a good water supply
to the trenches was (at the time of their making their report) “ being rectified.’'
Elsewhere in this Report reference is made to the lack of sweepers for sanitary work,
and the fact that a number of those sent out were not of the proper caste. For a con
siderable time also the Commissioners record “ the absence of any suitable machinery for
disinfecting clothing and other articles, but they state that this had been recently
supplied.
19. The above are merely small quotations showing the general tenor of the report
and of the defects which it discloses in almost every branch of the arrangements for dealing
with the sick and wounded, and the health of the troops. Full appreciation of the case
presented bv the Commissioners can only be attained by reading the text of their report.
20. We agree generally in the Yincent-Bingley Commission’s historical account of
the manner in which the foregoing defects affected the various phases of the campaign ;
but, as regards the early period up to the summer of 1915, we have amplified that account
in other parts of this Report.*
Advance to Ameira and Nasariyeh.
21. We agree that during May, June and July, 1915, in the advance to Amara and
the operations round Nasariyeh, the first substantial lengthening of the lines of ^
communications, the sick and wounded suffered considerable hardships. Hospital
River Steamers had now become essential, and they were not even asked for.
The general position can perhaps be best summed up in the words of one of our witnesses,
Colonel Giffard, a senior officer of the Indian Medical Service who was in command of a
hospital ship running between Bombay and Basra. He told us that up to June, I9I»>»
“ there was nothing either at Basra or Bombay that could be considered a breakdown,
but that in May, 1915, it was “ obvious to most of us medical officers, that even at Basra
the breaking strain was nearly reached.” He states that—
The patients in the hospitals at Basra were not comfortable. 1 he heat was almost unbearable, and they
were largely housed in thatched sheds. I saw these sheds badly overcrowded, the attendants were too few,
there was hardlv any ice; electric fans, although offered by the Madras fund in December, 1914, had not been
installed, and in every way it was a poor performance.
First Battle of Es Sinn or Kut-el-Amara.
22. At the battle of Kut-el-Amara (September 28th, 1915), the medical arrange
ments were not satisfactory. The Field Ambulances were insufficient and overcrowded.
The river transport used for evacuating the wounded was unsuitable. The steamers used
were insufficiently equipped. Part of the battlefield was eight miles distant from the river,
two motor cars were available, but otherwise severe cases had to be evacuated in Army
transport carts, a most inefficient substitute for motor ambulance transport or the light
pony tongas sent to Mesopotamia later. The hardships, in fact, of the wounded, who
numbered over 1,100, were considerable, though not nearly as severe as in later actions.
Battle of Ctesiphon.
23. After the battle of Ctesiphon (November 22nd, &c.) we have no hesitation in
saying there was a complete breakdown. The casualties (roughly 4,500 in a
fighting force of 13,500) were heavily underestimated. Here again, the conclusions of
the Yincent-Bingley Commission are abundantly supported by independent evidence
submitted to us. ^