'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎33v] (66/248)

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PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
A. The Vincent-Bingley Report and its Principal Conclusions.
* See Part IX., paras 48-50.
We wish now to draw attention to the comments which the Commissioneis made
• upon the following subjects.
Hotpital River Steamers.
6. They state that :—
The absence of any river steamers equipped for the transport of sick and wounded, and of any separate
medical establishment for such vessels, .... has had more prejudicial results than almost any other defect
in the organisation. It has constantly delayed evacuation, dislocated medical arrangements, and caused
great suffering and injury. So long as the operations were confined to the immediate vicinity of Basra there
was no need for any such transport, but directly columns advanced up the Tigris, Euphrates and Karun, the
necessity of some means of speedily evacuating the sick and wounded by water became apparent.
They add later :—
We are indeed forced to the conclusion that the necessity for an adequate provision of this kind of
transport was overlooked both in India and in Mesopotamia, until the sufferings of the wounded in Ctesiphon
made it apparent that some systematic steps must be taken to remedy the deficiency.
7. It is fair to say by way of comment on this that on November 23rd, 1915 that is
before the battle of Ctesiphon concluded—a telegram was despatched from Army Head
quarters, India, to Basra, pointing out the desirability of organising a fleet of Hospital
River Steamers on the Tigris, but such an intimation came too late to be of any practical
value, in meeting or easing the sufferings of those who were wounded in this battle, and in
the retreat which followed immediately afterwards. Even acceptance from private donors
of a hospital river barge, the “ Bengali,” in February, 1915, had failed to bring home to
the responsible authorities the necessity for providing special river accommodation for the
sick and wounded. On the loss of this barge on her way to Mesopotamia, nothing adequate
was done to replace her. Surgeon-General Hathaway, who in April, 1915, became Principal
Medical Officer in Mesopotamia, was, until August, 1915, of opinion that tugs and specially
fitted “ mahailahs ” would be an efficient substitute, an opinion in which we do not concur.
8. We have stated our views at greater length in another part of our report* upon this
subject of hospital river steamers, and therefore need not elaborate the point here beyond
pointing out that the use of the ordinary transport steamer which takes troops or supplies
up the river can never provide a satisfactory means of bringing the sick and wounded down
on the return journey. The sick and wounded require special fittings and appliances,
and a crowded steamer going up with troops or supplies cannot find room for the storage
of such things.
Medical Personnel and Equipment.
9. The Commissioners say :—
Another difficulty of the first magnitude has been the inadequacy of medical personnel and equipment/
. . . There was in our opinion no reason to think that the ordinary scale of medical units, as laid down in,
“ War Establishments, India,” would not be needed. Experience has indeed shown that, if anything, that
standard requires to be increased.
10. Our evidence shows that the organisation orders of Force “ D ” contemplated a
lower establishment than is laid down for a frontier campaign and that the actual amount
of medical personnel in Mesopotamia was during long periods far below even this meagre
' scale. But even had the full authorised establishment been provided and proved insuffi
cient, the blame for such insufficiency would rest on the medical authorities in India,
as medical establishments are not fixed by immutable laws, but according to the higher
military authorities’ estimate of what will actually be required on active service.
Hospitals.
11. As to hospitals, the Report says :—
From the date [early in 1915] on which the 2nd Division came to Mesopotamia, the general hospital
accommodation w r as insufficient for the needs of the force. .
There has been a consistent shortage in the personnel necessary to treat the number of sick and wounded.
The deficiencies in Stationary and Clearing Hospitals have been equally great.
Land Transport.
12. The Commissioners speak of “ the failure throughout the campaign to provide
land ambulance transport for the wounded.” They proceed "we consider this matter to
be one of great moment, as it is proved that the defect has been the cause of intense suffering,
and must have prejudiced the chances of recovery in certain cases.”