'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎31v] (62/248)

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PART IX.—TRANSPORT.
B. Railways.
58. Moreover, if military considerations really entered so largely into the Indian Govern
ment’s decision to refuse the railway, it was most unfortunate that both the Home
Government and Sir John Nixon were, at the time, informed that the railway was refused
on the ground of expense. This aspect of the matter is well brought out by Sir J. Nixon,
who says —
The difficulties of the Hammar Lake crossing were known in India, the extreme heat prevailing in
the summer was known in India, the discomfort and suffering not only to the wounded but to fit men was
known in India, and this proposal was rejected on the score of expense. This single instance seems to me
to disprove the claim that the Finance Department has not exerted a sinister influence on the operations.
The refusal of the railway and the terms in which the refusal was announced were
in fact bound to create the impression that the Indian Government were unwilling, in the
interests of economy, to provide Mesopotamia with what was desirable in the interests
of the troops.
Our conclusion is that the railway was refused because Sir Beauchamp Duff did not
agree with Sir John Nixon’s estimate of its military necessity and, apart from an assurance
from the Commander-in-Chief that the railway was absolutely necessary on military
grounds, the Indian Government were not prepared even to put the proposal before the
Secretary of State, because they were afraid that the expenditure might ultimately fall
upon India.
•
59. In January, 1916, Sir Percy Lake (the author of the memorandum of October 26th
in favour of the railway from Basra to Nasariyeh) had succeeded Sir John Nixon in com
mand of the Mesopotamia Expedition. Sir Percy Lake was apparently so much impressed
with the finality of the Indian Government’s decision not to sanction the building of
railways in Mesopotamia that he did not raise the matter until April, 1916, when specifically
asked to do so by the War Office, who in the meantime had taken over from the India
Office the control of military operations. Ultimately two railways were decided on in
Mesopotamia, but it was not until the War Office took over the administration in addition to
the control of the campaign in July, 1916, that the railways were really pressed forward with
the vigour which the situation demanded. We think it would be inadvisable to go into
details as to the exact position of the railway question at the present time, but we are
satisfied that the War Office have taken and are taking all the steps which are
necessary.
60. It is interesting to note that the cost of all the railways now being built in Mesopo
tamia is, according to the estimates, less than the cost of the river craft, and that if the
railways had been authorised at an early date a portion of the river craft might have been
unnecessary. Moreover, while it has required from one year to eighteen months to obtain
specially built steamers, the railways have been completed in eight to nine months.
From this brief history of the railway question in Mesopotamia it is obvious that
the Indian Government never paid to this vital matter the attention which the War Office
considered so essential directly they became responsible for the military operations.
61. Although the railway from Basra to Nasariyeh was strongly recommended by
General Barrett on February 28th, 1915, and by General Nixon on August 14th, 1915,
the proposal was dealt with in a dilatory manner by the Indian Government, and was
negatived by them in November, 1915, on the ground that it did not justify the expenditure
involved. It was only when asked for by the third General Officer Commanding the
expedition, General Lake, and under pressure from the War Office in April, 1916, that the
Indian Government assented to the proposal, and awoke to the necessity of railways for
the expedition. We feel that a grave- responsibility attaches to the Indian Government for
their failure to realise at an earlier date the importance of an energetic railway policy in
Mesopotamia.
Conclusions as to Transport.
62. The enquiries we have made, and the evidence, both oral and documentary, which
we have taken in this part of our investigation, lead us to the following conclusions
regarding the critical period up to April, 1916:—
(a) From the first the paramount importance both of river and railway transport in
Mesopotamia was insufficiently realised by the Military Authorities in India.