'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎30v] (60/248)

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PART IX.—TRANSPORT.
B. Railways.
51. We have already considered the manner in which the Indian Government
dealt with inland communications by water. We now turn to the question of com
munications by rail. In August, 1916, Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, informed the Committee of Imperial Defence : “ As regards
the question of communications the Committee is aware that India declined to
sanction certain proposals for railway construction, and that in general operations were
allowed in 1915 to develop without proper regard to the vital questions of supply and
maintenance.’' The justice of this criticism on the Indian Government became apparent
to us when we ascertained that two applications from the General Officer Commanding
in Mesopotamia had been made to the Indian Government for the building of railways,
that on each occasion the application was based either on the grounds of improving supplies
or communications, and that on each occasion the application was not agreed to by the
Indian Government.
52. The first mention of the desirability of a railway in Mesopotamia was made by
General Barrett, then General Officer Commanding the Expedition, on February 28th,
1915. He wired to India :—
I consider that the best solution for any advance towards Nasariyeh or even one or two marches beyond
Shaiba would be a light railway. Once Nasiriyeh was reached, the railway would be much used for moving
produce to and from Basrah. Thus, if it were once constructed, it would not only solve our supply difficulty,
but would also tend towards pacifying the country.
In a subsequent telegram General Barrett explained that he had asked for the railway
because he found it impossible otherwise to move any force larger than one brigade across
the desert. On March 13th he sent in particulars of the route which he suggested the
railway should follow, and added, “ I recommend that personnel and material should be
in Basra by May at latest, as I think it important that work should begin as soon as floods
subside.” So far as we can ascertain no action appears to have been taken by the Indian
Government on this application, except that they instructed Sir John Nixon (who succeeded
General Barrett in April, 1915) to report on the possibility of the employment of a light
railway of which material for 137 miles was available in India. The Indian Government
apparently did not attach importance to General Barrett’s recommendation, although it
was put forward on the military grounds of the desirability of facilitating supplies and com
munications and increasing the mobility of the force.
53. Owing to the flooded state of the country and other reasons into which it is not
necessary to enter, it was not till the beginning of August, 1915, that Sir J. Nixon raised
the question of rai ways with the Indian Government.
On August 2 nd, 1915, he telegraphed to the Chief of the General Staff in India asking
for particulars as to the 137 miles of light railway understood to be available. He asked
if it was the railway—said to be very indifferent—which had been used at the Coronation
Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). .
He also wrote to tell the Chief of the General Staff that he did not want that material,
but that he did want a railway. On August 11 th, 1915, the Chief of the General Staff
wrote to him that he had backed up his request for a railway, and had proposed standard
light 2 -ft. 6 -in. material used by the North-Western Railway, and not the light military
( Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). ) line.
On August 14th Sir J. Nixon forwarded to India a long despatch, supported by
memoranda from his technical officers, in which he asked for a railway from Basra to
Nasariyeh on ( 1 ) military, ( 2 ) political, and (3) commercial grounds. The military grounds
were principally the necessity for quick communication between Basra and Nasariyeh.
General Nixon added a demand for a suitable staff to carry out the preliminary work
in October, and concluded—
Finally it is most desirable that the general policy, as regards the railway, which I strongly recommend
as necessary, shall be determined as early as possible and a decision communicated. Next cold weather,
November to March inclusive, should be availed of to the fullest extent not only in preliminary investigation
but in actual construction.
54 . General Nixon’s despatch reached Headquarters in India on August 25th, but as
he had received no reply to it by October 24th, he then wired to India asking how the
question of railway construction in Mesopotamia stood. He was informed on October 30th
that the matter was still “ under the consideration of the Government.” A further
reminder from General Nixon on November 1 st at length produced a reply from the Chief
of the General Staff, Delhi, on November 14th, that “ for the present the Government