'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎28v] (56/248)

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PART IX.—TRANSPORT.
A. Shortage of River Transport.
was found almost impossible and some sections sank in 30 ft. of water. Part of the
remaining sections were the nordered to be sent on to Bombay for erection there, and
thereafter to be towed back to Basra, involving much cost, risk and delay. Material for
erection of the barges and other craft was sent out in large shipments. No descriptive
note of contents of packages accompanied the first shipments, and no drawings or
erection plans were sent with them. The. latter were only received in September, 1916,
for vessels, the materials for which had arrived four or five months previously. The
confusion which arose from this unbusinesslike proceeding was almost unbelievable,
and must have been heartbreaking, in view of the urgent need for the vessels. Cases
were discharged up and down the bank of the river and stretched a long distance. To
find a particular piece required for the completion of any particular barge, tug, or steamer
was almost hopeless.
To sum up :—
( 1 ) The paddle steamers sent were unhandy and otherwise unsuitable.
( 2 ) The square-ended barges proved a complete failure.
(3) Arrangements for erection of craft were altogether inadequate.
(4) Sections sent were too heavy for the local facilities.
(5) Lists of the contents of packages were not sent.
( 6 ) Necessary erection plans and drawings were not forthcoming.
More inept proceedings than those connected with the purchase and shipment of
river craft in England in 1915 and early in 1916 would be hard to find.
It is difficult for us, owing to the divided organisation of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , to exactly
apportion personal blame for this series of blunders, which were not only costly but also
caused regrettable delay. The Director-General of Stores apparently acted upon the
advice of Sir John Biles in allowing the specifications of the steamers and barges to be
altered. His action in other matters was unbusiness-like.
Erection and Repair Shops.
40. The workshops and slips which existed in Mesopotamia on the outbreak of wnr were
naturally of small size and quite unfitted to cope with the erection and repair of the large
fleet of river craft required by the Expeditionary Force. So far as normal conditions
were concerned, and even with the outlook of greater trade after the War, there was nothing
in prospect to induce the local firms largely to increase their workshops. In consequence
of arrangements with the Admiralty and India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. some extensions were undoubtedly
made, but these were far short of the needs. In our opinion, the importance of adequate
provision of workshops, slips and docks for the erection and repair of river vessels was not
apprehended by General Nixon, the Indian Government or the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. . The under
taking turned out to be one of great magnitude, and involved very large expenditure.
From incurring the latter General Nixon apparently shrank, and his demands towards the
end of the period of his command appear to have been on too small a scale. The fact that
provisions were not made at a much earlier date unfortunately greatly delayed the avail
ability for service of river craft—old and new. After the War Office took control during
1916, the matter was comprehensively taken in hand. Since that time over 7,000 tons of
plant for workshops have been sent from England, and large numbers of skilled mechanics
from England, India and elsewhere.
Port of Basra.
41. Up to October, 1914, Basra was a comparatively small commercial port, at which
the arrival of two or three steamers was a full weekly allowance. Owing to a bar at Fao,
only vessels drawing not more than 18 to 19 feet can reach Basra. It was largely a port of
transit for Baghdad and other places up the river, to and from which cargo was conveyed
by Messrs. Lynch Bros.’ steamers or by mahailas. The equipment of the port was primitive
and barely in keeping with the modest volume of its trade. There were no wharves for
ocean steamers, and the merchants’ warehouses were of small dimensions.
42. The facilities were, from the first, inadequate to cope with the needs of the Expe
ditionary Force, and to give reasonably rapid despatch to steamers bringing supplies. As
the force grew, and as the line of communications and voyages of the river steamers
lengthened, congestion at the port became greater. Administration of the port,
direction of the mooring of shipping, provision of lighters or mahailas, and discharge of
cargo overside, were placed in the hands of an officer of the Royal Indian Marine, under the
Inspector-General of Communications. Reception of cargo ashore was in the hands of
various military authorities, who each had their denots, such as Supplies and Transport,