'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [25r] (49/248)
The record is made up of 1 volume (122 folios). It was created in 1906-1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
PART IX.—TRANSPORT.
47
A. Shortage of River Transport.
therefore, cannot be relied on, although practicable with difficulties during part of the
year. Just above Kurna are what may be-called the Straits, where the passage of the
river at all times is difficult, and particularly so at the season of low river. One witness
—Commander Huddlestone, R.I.M., writes in an appendix to his evidence :—
The river between Kurna and Amara is roughly very narrow—some 85 to 250 feet broad—with real
hairpin corners, and very shallow, and a very strong current, some 3 to 6 knots. The banks are from 3 to
5 feet high, and the bend so sharp that the advance of the vessel coming down, notwithstanding the helm,
sends her—or rather, her barges* right smack against the banks. If she has not got barges she goes
against them herself. The result is not so bad at this time of the year, as would be expected, because
the bank gives way, and the vessel or barge bounds off again, cannons against the other side, and proceeds,
and repeats the performance some two or three times an hour, sometimes more, sometimes less. In
summer, when the banks are hard, the damage done to vessels and barges is immense, and even now they
do a considerable amount of damage to themselves, and so, in designing vessels, I give you what I think
are the chief points to be borne in mind :—
(1) Draught should not exceed 3 feet 6 inches for steamers, and 3 feet for barges.
(2) Length should not exceed 212 feet for steamers, and 170 feet for barges.
(3) The steamers should be made of steel, with independent paddles.
10 . Another witness, Commander Hamilton, R.I.M., stated in Ins evidence :—
I doubt if steamers really suitable for the Tigris exist anywhere, especially as troop-ships. So the only ones
that we can call really satisfactory (other than Lynch’s), will be the ones specially built, or building, in England
to our design on Lynch’s pattern. It is the shallow draught required, combined with the necessary size of
vessel and horsepower which renders any ready-made ones from other parts of the world more or less, and in
many cases quite, unsuitable. It must be remembered that the Tigris in the low-river season (a normal low-
river season) is, after all, only a glorified ditch in many parts. It is not yet fully realised by the Army, I think,
that last low-river season (August to March, 1915), was abnormally high. The result was that the compara
tively deep-draught steamers (about 5 feet actually), which we received from Burma were actually able to run
regularly right up to the front during all the low seasons. We had stipulated, and still stipulate, that 3 feet
6 inches is the standard safe draught for that river in low season. It is so normally, but the Army have got
so used to seeing the deeper-draught ones going successfully that I feel rather anxious about the outlook should
the river take it into its head to fall as low, as it can do on occasions. Should it do so, I fear a large part of
our ready-made imported fleet of paddlers would be out of action, as most of them are much over 3 feet 6 inches
when loaded. . . It has been found by experience (Lynch Bros, records), that it is not worth risking a draught
of over about 3 feet 6 inches in the low river. ^ Besides which paddle-steamers “ settle ’’ 7 or 8 inches when moving
in such shallow water, so that they always require several inches more water than their stationary draught
would lead one to suppose.
Above the Kurna Straits navigation is easier as far as Kut, except for some shallow
patches. Above that point the river is again difficult, and 3 feet 6 inches is the maximum
draught suitable. It is evident from all the information before us, that to rely on the
deeper draught vessels being able to navigate the river above Kurna at all times of the
year was to take a great risk, and what this risk might involve it is not difficult to picture.
17. In our opinion General Nixon was perfectly right in insisting that the maximum
draught of vessels supplied to him should not exceed 3 feet 6 inches, but he might have
made it more clear to the authorities in India that, failing these, he could make use of
deeper draught steamers during part of the year and during all the year on certain stretches
of the river. On the other hand, General Nixon does not appear to have appreciated
at an early stage in the operations that such vessels as he required were not obtainable
ready-made, and would have to be specially built. The result was that demands were sent
forward embodying cast-iron conditions which could not all be fulfilled by ready-made
vessels, while the authorities in India showed little appreciation of General Nixon’s
difficulties, and were not very helpful in suggesting substitutes, many of which, it was
afterwards found, were available, although not in all respects suitable. It was only on
July 10 th, 1915, that General Nixon sent forward General Kemball's survey of the
situation, and recommended the building of steamers, tugs and barges suitable for the
river. These could not reasonably have been expected to be available for use before the
middle of 1916, and, as a matter of fact, they were not ready until later.
18. In making the advance from Kurna to Kut (a distance by river of 243 miles),
we are of opinion that General Nixon took great risk ( 1 ) on account of the inadequacy
of his river transport as a whole, and ( 2 ) on account of the inability of a large portion of
it to navigate the river above Kurna in a normal low-water season. Our opinion in regard
to this is even stronger when we come to consider the advance from Kut towards Baghdad,
because, first, the river above Kut is shallow, secondly, the distance from the base is
greater (an additional difficulty if river transport above Kut was to be relied on), and
thirdly, General Nixon by that time knew of the large reinforcements which he was to
* Which are attached to her on either side.
About this item
- Content
A signed proof, folios 1-100, plus additional material, folios 101-124. The cover bears the signature of Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under-Secretary of State. The report has been annotated in blue pencil at various points.
Contents:
- 'Part I. Preface.
- 'Part II. Origin of Mesopotamia [Iraq] Expedition.'
- 'Part III. Advance from Basra to Kurna.'
- 'Part IV. The Advance to Amara [Al-'Amārah] and Kut [Al-Kūt].'
- 'Part V. Correspondence and Telegrams as to Advance on Baghdad.'
- 'Part VI. The Advance from Kut to Ctesiphon.'
- 'Part VII. Operations for Relief of Kut.'
- 'Part VIII. Armament, Equipment, Reinforcements, &c.'
- 'Part IX. Transport.'
- 'Part X. Medical Breakdown.'
- 'Part XI. Causes Contributing to the Errors of Judgement and Shortcomings of Responsible Authorities.'
- 'Part XII. Findings and Conclusions. Recommendations.'
- 'Separate Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP.'
- 'Appendix I. Vincent-Bingley Report.'
- 'Appendix II. Memorandum by Sir Beauchamp Duff.'
- 'Appendix III. Colonel Hehir's Account of the Siege of Kut-el-Amara.'
Additional material:
- Folio 101. Manuscript note [by Arthur Hirtzel] on net military expenditure.
- Folios 102-109. Copy of the East India (Army Administration), Further Papers regarding the Administration of the Army in India , 1906.
- Folios 110-115. Manuscript notes, titled 'Suggested redraft & amplification of second half of parag 1' [unknown hand].
- Folio 116. A clipping from the Daily Telegraph , Wednesday 4 July 1917, featuring an article titled 'Mesopotamia. Ex-Viceroy's Statement. The Medical Breakdown.'
- Folios 117-124. An expanded typescript version of Hirtzel's manuscript notes (folio 101).
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (122 folios)
- Arrangement
A table of contents can be found at folio 4v.
An index can be found at folios 93-97.
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the front cover with 1, and terminates at the last folio with 124; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is present in parallel between ff 110-115; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled. Pagination: the file also contains an original printed pagination sequence. The volume comprises a stitched pamphlet, and other stitched and loose-leaf material.
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- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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- IOR/L/PS/20/257
- Title
- 'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.'
- Pages
- front, front-i, 2r:115v, 117r:124v
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
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- Open Government Licence
!['Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎25r] (49/248) 'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎25r] (49/248)](https://iiif.qdl.qa/iiif/images/81055/vdc_100000000912.0x0000b2/IOR_L_PS_20_257_0049.jp2/full/!1200,1200/0/default.jpg)