'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎23v] (46/248)

41
PART IX.—TRANSPORT.
A. Shortage of River Transport.
someone with experience of the management of such flotillas on one of the-rivers of India
or Burma was not at an early date appointed to assist in this work. Being clearly of
opinion that shortage of transport was one of the chief causes of the failure to capture
Baghdad and to relieve Kut, as well as a cause of deplorable suffering of the sick and
wounded, we have endeavoured to ascertain where the responsibility primarily lay.’
6 . In November, 1914, when General Barrett took possession of Basra, the river
tiansport axadable consisted of three steamers, viz., the “ Medjidieh,” which was the
most serviceable, the ‘‘ Julnar,” which r?quired new engines, and the Salimi, which
was used as a ferry boat between Basra and Kurna. Besides these there were four lighters
of 60 tons, one of BO tons, two of 110 tons and ten of 200 , making seventeen in all, and
some country sailing boats, or mahailas, with a capacity of from 25 to 35 tons. In the
words of a witness
“ The mahailas were very useful for unloading ships in the stream, and bringing the contents to shore.
But to go any distance they take a very long time indeed, and if the wind is against them and the tide is
against them and the current is against them they cannot move at all. The mahailas that went from Basra
to Kurna, about 30 miles roughly, used to start one day and get up there on the third day, or afterwards.
7 . On November 23rd 1914, after Basra was occupied, at a conference held at Army
Headquarters, Commander A. Hamilton, R.I.M., recommended to the General Staff that
they should at once ask for 12 river steamers of the “Medjidieh” class. Commander
Hamilton had previously been on the Tigris for two years, and had surveyed the river from
Basra to Baghdad. He was, therefore, competent to speak with exceptional knowledge
both o‘: the river and of the class of steamer most suitable to its navigation. He urged
the necessity of giving orders early, and, owing to the necessary delay in building the
vessels, which he estimated at 12 months, he suggested that they should be got from India
ready-built. There is reason to believe that had Commander Hamilton’s foresight, know
ledge, and advice at once been acted upon, subsequent difficulties would have been miti
gated, if not altogether avoided. General Barrett does not remember the circumstances.
He may perhaps have been influenced by the limited scope of the immediate operations
then authorised, but we must note that it is clear from his evidence to us and the A incent-
Bingley Commission that he realised that the expedition would in all probability have to
advance as far as Amara and Nasariyeh. At any rate, the Staff at that time did not
consider the matter urgent, although it was allowed that six more steamers might be
required. Nothing, however, was done until January 2 nd, 1915, when, in reply to an
enquiry as to the steamers available for use above Kurnah, General Barrett telegraphed
to India that, in order to carry a force of one brigade, one squadron, one battery and one
company of sappers and miners, with 500 mules and supplies for 10 days, seven steamers
and one or two lighters would be required in addition to the existing flotilla. These seven
steamers and two lighters were purchased in India during February, 1915. They arrived
at Basra in May of the same year. On February 17th, 1915, General Barrett asked for
four river tugs, which were purchased in India early in March, 1915, and arrived at Basra
shortly after the seven steamers.
8 . On May 27th, 1915, General Nixon, who had in April taken command, informed
India that the paddle steamers and tugs sent could not be relied upon to work above
Kurna, owing to their comparatively deep draught and to the lowness of the river at certain
seasons, and asked for six more tugs of certain power, and with a draught not to exceed
3 feet, subsequently modified to 3 feet 6 inches. There were difficulties in finding in
India tugs conforming to the specification, and the order was ultimately passed on to England
and merged in the August demand* for river craft to be built there. On July 8 th, 1915,
a comprehensive memorandum was drawn up by General Kemball and forwarded to India
by General Nixon. In this memorandum the shortage of river craft and the urgent need
for further supplies of craft of a suitable type were strongly emphasized, and warnings
given that if steps were not taken in good time to meet these requirements grave risks
were being run of a breakdown at possibly a serious moment. General Kemball says :—
Had we had sufficient river transport we could have entered Nasiriyeh at the heels of the Turkish force
defeated at Shaiba, and at the same time despatched troops to drive off the Turks then threatening the pipe
line up the Karun. We had sufficient troops, but not sufficient steameni, to undertake simultaneous opera
tions.
The same conditions have obtained ever since.
Before an advance could be made from Qurnah the return of the n learners taken by General Gorringe
up the Karun had to be awaited.
* See paragraph 9 below.