'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎22r] (43/248)

PART VIII.—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC. 41
* Drafts and Reinforcements.
under the stress of war, whilst assistant recruiting officers, who numbered 14 before the war,
were only increased to 25. Other steps were certainly taken, such as the formation of
local recruiting committees, obtaining of assistance from local Governments and native j
states, etc., but these seem to us somewhat inadequate methods for raising men at such ,
a time.
At the same time it is only fair to say that although the means taken may seem rather
meagre, yet the recruits obtained were sufficient to enable the ranks of the Indian forces
in the field to be kept at a fairly generous numerical standard after the withdrawal of the
Indian Divisions from France. These recruits were mostly utilised to increase the establish
ment of existing units. This process within limits is preferable to creating new formations,
especially in view of the difficulty of obtaining British Officers.
Re in f j r ce ments .
15. The history of the supply of reinforcements to Force 4 ' D " is a melancholy tale
of altercation between London and Simla. Although up to the time of the advance on
Baghdad the expedition was always numerically strong enough to cope with the Turkish
forces, yet this result was only attained after protracted wrangling between the Govern
ments at home and in India, neither of whom appeared willing to accept the task of re
inforcing an expedition, for the success of which they were jointly responsible. When at the ’
commencement of the campaign the 6 th Division was ordered to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. by the
Home Government in October, 1914, we cannot find that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. or their Military
Adviser, Sir Edmund Barrow, ever contemplated or arranged for its reinforcement from
England in case of need, although it was obvious that even if the expedition were successful,
the Turks would make strong efforts to oust it from Mesopotamia, whilst if it were unsuccess
ful the need for reinforcement would have been even more urgent. On the other hand,
the Indian Government adopted the attitude that, having already denuded India of
troops by overseas expeditions, it was impossible to send reinforcements from India
to Mesopotamia. The danger and friction created by such a situation is well exemplified
by what happened in the early part of 1915. At that period the military authorities
in England and India were agreed that the Mesopotamia Expedition was in danger of
attack by superior Turkish forces, and that its reinforcement by a Division was imperative;
but the Secretary of State informed the Viceroy that no reinforcements could be despatched
from England, and the Viceroy informed the Secretary of State that no further troops could
be spared from India. The difficulty was only got over after much delay and discussion
by the Home Government definitely ordering India to send reinforcements to Mesopotamia,
and relieving the Viceroy of all responsibility for any consequent danger to India. The
reinforcements were sent, though only at the last moment, and they enabled Sir J. Nixon
to defeat and drive the Turks before him in the spring and summer of 1915.
16. The next occasion on which considerable reinforcements were required in Mesopo
tamia was in connection with the advance on Baghdad, which was sanctioned in October,
1915. Again both the Indian and Home Governments agreed that reinforcements amount
ing to one or two divisions were essential if the advance was to be undertaken, and again we
find each Government trying to put upon the other the responsibility for providing part or
all of the necessarv troops. Owing to the uncertain position of the operations in other
theatres of the war, the Imperial authorities found it difficult to guarantee the despatch of
two divisions to Mesopotamia within the necessary time, and asked India whether, pending
such despatch, she could not, in the meantime, herself provide another division. With
the intention of evading this liability, the Indian Government resorted to procedure which,
to say the least of it, was disingenuous. There were at the time available in India as
reinforcements three batteries of artillery, three cavalry regiments, and two infantry
brigades. Information as to the availability of these reinforcements was, however, with
held from the Home Government, and the explanation of this omission is given in a letter
from the Military Secretary of Sir Beauchamp Duff to the Military Secretary of the Viceroy
in the following words :—
It is clear that the Home Government are very anxious that Baghdad should be taken, and they will
send us the required force if we hold out, but they will give us nothing if the least sign of willingness to find
reinforcements is shown by us, and we shall have to do it all by ourselves, and be so weak everywhere that both f
in India and in Mesopotamia we shall be in danger.
17. Ultimately, the Home Government agreed to find and despatch the two divisions re
quired, but they did not arrive within the time limit originally regarded by India as essential;
(C 48—176) F