'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎16r] (31/248)

PART VL—THE ADVANCE FROM KUT TO CTESIPHON.
29
1 . The total force at the disposal of Sir John Nixon at the time the advance was made
to Baghdad was only some two divisions or about 24,000 to 25,000 men. Of these there
went up with General Townshend the Sixth Division, plus one Infantry Brigade and
two and a half regiments of cavalry with a brigade and certain batteries of artillery,
numbering in all from 15,000 to 17,000, according to the estimate of General Gorringe,
who was at the time in command of the troops on the Lines of Communication. The
remainder of the force, some 6.000 to 8,000 men, were left to guard the lines of communi
cation and our positions on the Euphrates at Nasariyeh and on the Karun at Ahwaz.
The line of communications from Basra to Baghdad via the River Tigris is 502 miles.
2 . It will thus be seen that on General Gorringe’s estimate, 75 per cent, of our total
available force was required for the offensive. The remaining 25 per cent, were guarding
the communications and rear positions and could not be looked upon as a reserve. The
Turkish forces between Kut and Baghdad were believed to be about 9,000, and it was fur
ther assumed that they were considerably demoralised by a succession of defeats to which
they had been subject.
3. Based upon these estimates, a spirit of intense optimism animated the Head,
quarter and Administrative Staff. This is shown by their estimate of impending casualties,
preparation being made for only 500 severely wounded. Two river steamers, the 4 Mosul ”
and the “ Julnar,” were put on one side to be temporarily fitted up by Surgeon-General
Hathaway for the reception of wmunded, the arrangements being that the more seriously
wounded were to be moved down to Kut in these vessels and the more lightly wounded
located in Baghdad. No apprehension of an effective repulse or of our inability to reach
Baghdad seems to have been entertained by those directing the advance.
4. After some skirmishing, our advancing forces, consisting according to General
Townshend of only some 11,000 effectives, w r ere concentrated on the left bank of the Tigris
at Laj. The enemy, estimated at 11,000 to 13,000 men, were entrenched a few miles up the
river, their defences consisted of two strong lines of trenches, and between these two
lines was the archway of Ctesiphon. General Towmshend attacked this position on the
morning of November 22 nd, and after severe fighting he captured the first position, taking
with it 1,300 prisoners. Our troops then penetrated the second line of trenches and
captured eight guns. Here they were heavily attacked by Turkish reinforcements and
forced back into the first line which they had previously captured. November 23rd was
spent in reorganising these positions and collecting the wounded, and on the 24th and 25th
prisoners and wounded were evacuated to Laj, udiere they were put in steamers and taken
down stream.
5 . In the meantime, the enemy was largely reinforced, and General Townshend found
himself after his heavy casualties not only numerically very inferior to the enemy, but in
some danger of being surrounded and cut off. He was also short of supplies. He retired
during the night of November 25th to Laj, falling back further on the 27th to Aziziyeh.
He there fought a rearguard action back to Umm-al-Tubal where several of his steamers
grounded, and he had to remain there till December 1 st, by which time they were refloated.
A heavy attack by the Turks on the morning of the 1 st was repulsed with great loss to the
enemy, and, taking advantage of a successful counter-attack made by the cavalry brigade,
General Townshend retired to Shadi, a distance of 30 miles, which place was reached on
the same night. On December 3rd the troops, greatly exhausted, arrived at Kut-el-Amara.
Our losses at and since the battle of Ctesiphon amounted to more than 690 killed and 3,800
wounded, a loss of over 30 per cent, of the total advancing force.
6 . It has been alleged that the failure to reach Baghdad was in part due to the delays
caused by the lengthy discussions as to whether the advance should take place or not. This
may have been partly so ; but if these discussions had been shorter than they were, the
state of the transport would have prevented General Townshend from advancing much
sooner than he did. After his victory at Kut-el-Amara, on September 28th, six weeks were
spent in bringing up reinforcements and supplies, and his original plan of a rapid pursuit
and following close on his enemies’ heels into Baghdad soon proved impracticable.
The Turks had ample time to prepare a strong position at Ctesiphon : but had it
not been for the reinforcements which reached them before our attack took place, it
appears clear that they would have been defeated. The British Force had the utmost
confidence in their leader, and the manner in which they fought did not indicate any
loss of moral.