'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎13v] (26/248)

24 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.
18. On the 21 st October the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy, as
follows :—
Private. Baghdad advance. Report of combined Staffs estimates that General Nixon has only some
9,OCX) Turkish troops and some irregulars to deal with for next two months ; that Turkish forces may be some
what increased by the end of the year, and they might conceivably reach a total of 60,000 by end of January,
and even larger figures during 1916. They consider if reinforced by two Indian Divisions from h ranee he might,
with assistance of river flotilla, face risk of attack by 60,000, but there would remain possibility of enemy
receiving at later date further reinforcements. The staffs hold, therefore, that from a military point of view
it would be unwise to occupy Baghdad unless military authorities have power to withdraw troops at once
without regard to political considerations if military exigencies make this necessary. The War Office would
give the two Indian Divisions, but could not under any circumstances spare further reinforcements, and are
doubtful of their capacity even to supply drafts if wastage from casualties or sickness is severe. They think
Baghdad can be easily taken and held for some time, but it might become untenable later as explained above.
At present moment it seems the German attempt to break through to Constantinople will succeed, and our posi
tion and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain. . . . Arabs are wavering, and will probably join
Turks, unless we can offer them great inducement. We are therefore, in great need of striking success in the
East. . . . It is suggested that we should occupy Baghdad, giving assurances to Arab leaders that we
favour creation of Arab State independent of Turks. . . . Unless you consider possibility of eventual
withdrawal is decisive against the advance, all other considerations seem to us to render it desirable, and we
are prepared to order it.
On the 23rd October the Viceroy replied :—
Private. Your private telegram of the 21st instant. Baghdad advance. \our description of the
■ituation in the Near East proves conclusively the necessity for action in the Middle East. W e accept the
calculation of the combined Staffs of possible strength of Turks that may with time be brought against us ;
but with reinforcement of two Indian divisions from France we believe that Sir J. Nixon has a fair prospect
of being able to hold his own against 60,000 or 70,000 Turks, provided he occupied Baghdad as soon as he is
; ready. Although I realise that the occupation of Baghdad is a provocation that will probably determine
I the Turks to send large forces to attack us, which however, will not be easy for them to do, and although the
bad effect of a possible withdrawal in the future cannot be ignored, I am confident right policy at the present time
is to take the risk and to occupy Baghdad with the least possible delay, relying upon you to send two divisions
from France as quickly as possible to Mesopotamia. On this understanding I propose, unless I hear from you
before Monday to the contrary, to order Nixon to march on Baghdad at once.
Finally, on the 23rd October, the Secretary of State sent the following telegram :—
If Nixon is satisfied that the force he has available is sufficient for the operation, he may march on Baghdad.
Two divisions will be sent to him as soon as possible, but owing to relief and transport arrangements, reinforce
ments will take time to despatch. Probable date will be (? wired) later.
19. During the period of three weeks covered by these telegrams a number of meetings
had been held, and memoranda written by the Military Advisers of the Government in
London. These papers and consultations were less concerned with the taking of Baghdad
than with the question whether it would be possible to hold it after it had been taken.
On October 4 th, General Barrow, the Military Secretary, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , had written a
memorandum in which he expressed the opinion that to attempt to go to Baghdad with the
present force was to incur unjustifiable risk.
On October 6 th, the General Staff, in a memorandum, stated that to hold Baghdad,
except with forces very much larger than at present with Sir John Nixon, and with propor
tionately increased river transport, would be to court disasters. 60,000 Turks could be
assembled and conveyed within a few weeks to Baghdad, and to withdraw from
Baghdad after occupation would have a most unfortunate effect.
On October 14th, another paper was drawn up by the General Staff on the question
of occupying Baghdad. They estimated that if Baghdad was to be taken and occupied,
General Nixon must have reinforcements of two Indian divisions. On the 19th the joint
Naval and Military General Staff further considered the question, and came to the con
clusion that if there were very strong political objections to a withdrawal from Baghdad
then its occupation should not be attempted.
On October 16th General Barrow, the Military Secretary, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , modified his
previous proposals by stating that if he had a firm promise of two divisions, he was entirely
in favour of going to Baghdad.
20 . Expert opinion was therefore unanimous on the point that to attempt to take
^.rd necugy Baghdad with the existing force would be an unjustifiable risk, and that for
the task of holding Baghdad, General Nixon should have a reinforcement of two
divisions. There was, however, a concurrence of expert opinion that Nixon's existing
force was sufficient in the first instance to take Baghdad.
21 . In addition to the ordinary Military Authorities with whom questions of this kind