'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎9r] (17/248)

PART III.—ADVANCE FROM BASRA TO KURNA.
15
1 . As soon as we had established our occupation of Basra, it was suggested by our
Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. on the spot, Sir Percy Cox, that an announcement should be made that the
occupation would be permanent. This suggestion was peremptorily swept on one side by
His Maj esty’s Government, on the ground that it would be utterly contrary to the agreement
come to between the Allies, if occupation of any conquered country were at once announced
to be permanent, without waiting for the final settlement to be made at the close
of war. But whilst this proposal was stopped, the Military Secretary of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors.
submitted, on November 27th, that it would be advisable to push on and occupy Kurna,
50 miles above Basra at the junction of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The advantages
of this position were :—
( 1 ) Its commanding military value.
( 2 ) The control it gives us of the whole navigable waterway to the Gulf.
(3) The possession of the whole of the rich cultivated area from Kurna to the
sea.
(4) The fact that it completely covers Persian Arabistan and safeguards it
from Turkish intrigues or incursions.
(5) The moral effect on the Arabs.
( 6 ) The control of the telegraph up to this point and also of the passage of the
Euphrates.
2 . Lord Crewe, who was Secretary of State for India at this time, whilst ready to assent
to an advance on Kurna, deprecated any idea of a further advance for the present. Opera
tions against Kurna were successfully concluded on December 9th by the surrender of the
town together with the Wali and 1,200 prisoners and nine guns. Our authority was thus
established over the whole of the river tract between Kurna and the sea.
3. Early in 1915 news was received of a Turkish concentration for an attack on
Basra, and the oil-pipe was threatened up the Karun River. The threatened attack of
the Turks and the unrest of the Arabs necessitated further reinforcements, and another
brigade was sent from India, arriving on February 7th, 1915. The Indian Government,
though reluctant at first to send any further troops, finally acquiesced in the despatch of
this force. This reinforcement proved insufficient, and the position became somewhat
critical. There was an unsuccessful skirmish up the Karun River near Ahwaz, and the
situation became so acute that on March 5th the Government of India were peremptorily
ordered by the Home Government to despatch another brigade. The Government in
England at the same time entirely relieved the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief from
any responsibility as to what subsequently might occur in India from this further depletion
of their available military reserves. This brigade, with two others, made up the second
Division in Mesopotamia, which is hereafter known as the Twelfth Division.
4. On April 1 st, the Government of India decided, but without obtaining the consent
of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , to reorganise the expedition as an Army Corps, and General Nixon
and Staff were landed on April 9th. At Basra, General Melliss, with the additional forces
previously sent, achieved a brilliant victory at Barjisiyah near Basra on April 14th, 1915,
and there had also been successful fighting two days previously, near Shaiba. These victories
and the increase of force enabled the expedition to consolidate its position ; but, though the
force was doubled, the medical equipment sent to the two last brigades was not up to
the authorised scale of equipment, and practically two divisions had medical equipment
for only one, and their equipment was upon the Indian and not the British scale. Neither
was there made such an addition to the river steamer transport as to bring its proportions
up to the requirements of the increased forces. These deficiencies do not seem to have had
sufficient recognition by the Government of India.