File 2182/1913 Pt 6 'Arabia Relations with Bin Saud' [‎20r] (48/547)

From Sir P. Cox, 20th December 1917.
(Addressed to Foreign and repeated to Secretary of State for India
and High Commissioner, Cairo.)
(Received 21st December, 5 p.m.)
6184. In continuation of my telegram, 6070, of 15th December. The
mam topjcs on which Bin Sand wished to unburden himself were as
follows
(1) Relations of ourselves and the Sheikh of Koweit and the Annan
tribe.
(2) The respective rights of himself and Sheikh of Koweit to levy tribute
from Awazim tribe. This question hinges upon Ajman problem with whom
the Awazim are connected, r/c/c third paragraph of Article at page 190 of
Persianj^Gazetteer.
(3) Question of illicit trading to enemy, whether from Koweit or from
Qasim.
As regards (1) the history of Bin Sand’s feud with Ajman will be found in
my Arab Bureau Nos. 18, of 25th July 1916, and 62, of 14th September
1916. Bin Sand resents their being allowed to reside or market from Koweit
or occupied territory, and considers that in not obliging certain sections of
them to remain in Koweit or British territory in accordance with undertaking
given to us last year, we failed adequately to safeguard his interests. The
fact is, without employment of troops, neither is the Sheikh of Koweit able
effectively to deny them access to Koweit, nor are we able to control their
movements. It was my hope and advice that Bin Sand would come to a
temporary reconciliation with them in view of larger interests at stake, but
owing to loss of his brother at their hands, his animosity towards them is
implacable, and it appears from his conversations with Phil by that although
he does not specifically admit it, his failure to make any big move against
Bin Rashid has been partly due to fear that in his absence Ajman might
threaten his rear, and even move against Hasa. This aspect of the matter,
however, he has never hinted at hitherto, nor do I think apprehension was
justified. Difficulty was provisionally settled with him on following lines :—
Hamilton, on returning to Koweit, is to explain situation to Sheikh Salem,
and through him call on Ajman to accept one of two alternatives—they
must either join our friend^ Pad ad Beg/Ibn Hadhdhal, and remain neutral
or act with him, or their leaders must go to Bin Sand and make submission
and arrange to live where he directs in territory under his control.
In the event of their not accepting either of above alternatives the
tribes to be regarded as hostile and not allowed to enter Koweit or British
territory.
As regards Awazim it is arranged that Colonel Hamilton shall endeavour
to induce Sheikh of Koweit to write friendly letter to Bin Saud deprecating
continuance of friction in connection with this tribe, reaffirming brotherly
affection and suggesting friendly reversion to old arrangement by which the
Awazim paid taxes to Sheikh. If such letter is received Bin Saud agrees to
accept solution without reserve.
As regards problem of trade to enemy Bin Saud declines to accept any
responsibility for leakage via Qasim until an adequate blockade is established,
at Koweit on the ground that by so doing he only penalises his own subjects
for the benefit of enemy traders in Koweit or elsewhere. A suitable form
of permit and other restrictive arrangements have been devised with Bin
Saud which should prove effective in conjunction with institution of adequate
blockade at Koweit. Latter measure will be difficult without assistance of
troops. As you are aware this question is under lively consideration but it
cannot be settled pending Colonel Hamilton’s return to Koweit at the end of
month.
The above disposes of non-military problems discussed. The military
situation and possibilities will be dealt with in separate telegram.