‘Report for the Army Council on Mesopotamia. By Sir John P Hewett, GCSI, KBE’ [‎23v] (51/119)

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incurred on any one scheme in the accounts of the military force, and the balance to the revenues of the
occupied territory. The expenditure in Ashar was held to have been incurred primarily for reasons
connected with the administration of the occupied territory, and therefore to be debitable to its revenues.
The ruling in respect of the expenditure in Kut and Basrah was that, if the measure which led to it arose
primarily from military considerations, the whole of the expenditure should be charged in the accounts
of the military force. The decision on the case at Ashar was perhaps hardly consistent with the first of
the principles laid down by the Government of India, and it is not easy to discover why the charges
in those two instances should have been wholly debited to civil revenues, while the expenditure in Kut
and Basrah should have been wholly debited against army funds. We were informed that, as the result
of the orders of the Government of India, the whole of the expenditure both at Kut and Basrah has for
the time being been shown in the cash accounts of the civil administration, under whose direction the
works have been carried out, and will be, it is understood, finally adjusted against the military •estimates
by the Controller of War Accounts. I have been over the huts in Basrah. They are well situated, and
the area on which they stand is much less crowded than other areas in Basrah. They have been supplied
with water and sanitary needs at the expense of Army funds on the reasonable ground that, m order to
protect the military, it was necessary to ensure that the residents had pure water and good sanitary
arrangements. The refugees from Bagdad have all left, and most of the huts are now in the occupation
of other civil residents. They would be quite suitable for use as model tenements. Considering the
nature of the emergency, to meet which the houses were repaired in Kut, and the huts erected in Basrah,
and the use to which they are now being put, the charge is one which civil revenues ought to be called
upon the bear. The actual cost of erecting the huts was Rs. 3,93,357 (£26,250), and the civil authorities
have credited the military funds with Rs. 29,064 (£1,938), on account of recoveries of rent. If this sum is
refunded to the civil department and no debit made against Army funds by the Controller of W ar Accounts
the transaction will be completed.
51. The general effect of the application of the principles of Sir Godfrey Fell’s letter of the 6th March,
1918, appears to have been to neutralize the previous intention that cases should be decided on their
merits. On the other hand it has undoubtedly prevented frequent references regarding comparatively
small items of expenditure. Thus a question arose as to the distribution of the cost of repairs to the
Musandaq embankment. The repairs were originally undertaken in 1916-17, to prevent the moveable
column at Ali Gharbi from being cut off from movement up the right bank of the river. But it had two
other purposes in that it was designed (i) to prevent the Tigris from changing its course, and breaking
through to the Hai, and (ii) to protect a large area in low-lying country behind the embankment, the
crops on which were destroyed by its breaking in 1915. The Financial Adviser thought that the charge
should be borne by civil funds, but, in view of the project having been primarily of military interest,
and of the sum involved being small (viz., Rs. 8,038) (£536), it was determined not to refer the case to
the Government of India.
At the same time the effect of the principles which the Government of India have enforced must
necessarily be that practically every item of expenditure incurred by the military authorities is debited
to Army funds, though the ultimate benefit to the civil administration may be greater than to the Army.
On the other hand, it is not easy to conceive that there could be many cases of expenditure debited in the
first instance to the civil administration where the benefit to the Army could ever equal, much less exceed,
that to the civil population. The principles did not appear to the military authorities to be just, and the
fact that the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief was informed by the War Office [Letter No. 121/3/767
(F. la) dated the ‘llth November], that the Army Council were pleased that the matter of the three cases
referred to above had been brought to their notice, led them to believe that higher authority shared their
opinion. It does not seem likely that in future cases will arise, in which expenditure will be incurred
from military funds except on purely military objects.
52. In the telegram from the Viceroy (Army Department) No. 9,122 [82(6)], dated the 20th July,
1917, to the Secretary of State for India occurs the expression, with reference to the demands made on
India for money, men and materials, “We cannot help feeling that the drain is not wholly for purposes
essential to the war, but includes projects that are really a matter of later peace development,” and, in
Mr. Seabrooke’s letter to the War Office, No. 22,226 [82(7)], dated the 3rd July, 1917, it was stated that
“ Mr. Chamberlain is strongly impressed by information which has reached him from India as to the rapid
growth of expenditure in connection with the Mesopotamia force, with the necessity for a close scrutiny
of that portion of the expenditure which has no real bearing on the conduct of the War or the comfort and
efficiency of the force.” To the War Office letter No. 121/Finance/l,189 (F.I.a) [82(8)], dated the
13th September, 1917, asking that the nature of the expenditure which was regarded as coming under
this definition might be specified, a reply [82(10)], came dated the 29th September, 1917, the office of
Secretary of State for India having in the meantime changed hands, that Mr. Secretary Montagu under
stood, “ that the information before Mr. Chamberlain regarding the growth of expenditure in Mesopotamia
was not of an official nature, but reached him from private sources.” My instructions directed me to
report to the Army Council whether, in matters other than the development of irrigation and agriculture,
expenditure in Mesopotamia charged ultimately against Imperial Army Funds was being duly confined
to such services as were presently necessary for the prosecution of the war. During my visit to Mesopo
tamia I have, in accordance with these instructions, endeavoured to ascertain whether the suggestion
that during the war, the military authorities have authorised expenditure for purposes not essential for
the war, but really a matter of later peace development, and that Army funds have been spent by them
on matters which have no real bearing on the conduct of the war, or the comfort and efficiency of the
force, has any foundation. Either some of those with me, or I, myself, have visited practically every
undertaking, work or building of any importance which has been carried out in Mesopotamia at the cost