'Memorandum by Sir M Durand on the situation in Persia' [‎49r] (31/42)

•^Following the principle already enunciated in the foregoing papers, it would seem
nev^ssary to establish a responsible Ministry, with a permanent staff in the capital and the
provinces.
The system of government in Persia has already allowed of a capable Minister
appointing his agents in the chief centres of the country, but these, unfortunately, are
liable to removal with the downfall of their chief, and consequently their authority is of a
very temporary and abstract nature.
There is no reason why the agents should not form part of the permanent staff of
the Ministry in the same way that the Peshkar forms part of the permanent staff of
the Minister of Finance, or the Farrash Bashi of the Minister of Interior. If the
principle of permanency were once recognized, the groundwork of government would
have been laid. The permanent staff would carry out their duties at the chief centres,
whilst they would have sub-agents or honorary Magistrates to assist them in every part of
the country.
(The latter need not necessarily be paid, for many would serve as a matter of honour
and prestige).
All ordinary cases would be tried by these agents; more serious cases would be
referred to the decision of Committees composed of several Magistrates, presided over by
Proposal for the
establishment of a.
permanent staff.
one of the permanent agents.
A separation of the judicial and executive functions would form part of this system. Separation of the
It would be the duty of the Governors and his permanent staff of Farrash-Bashis, judicial from the
Farrashes, &c,, to see that the orders of the judicial agents were properly executed, executive function*
It is essential that the judgments or decrees of the agents should be given effect to by
the civil authorities; the agents or Magistrates confining themselves entirely to the
judicial side of the law.
So far I have only spoken of the Urf law as administered civilly. There is also Administration of
the Sharh, or Religious Law, to be considered. Sharh laws.
It has been stated in Part I, Paper No. 7? that the Ulema have the absolute right
to judge certain cases which come under the jurisdiction of the Religious Law. Now such
right can by no means be interfered with.
The Ulema must remain sole arbiters in their own branch. Like the agents of the
Urf law, however, they will be dependent on the civil authority for the execution of
their judgments. I would remark that a systematic administration of the Uvf Laws
would do much to diminish the influence of the Moolahs, and so, in a very direct way, add
to the influence of Government.
A permanency of system such as suggested would establish lay justice on a firmer General note,
basis, whilst registration of cases by the permanent staff would in the course of time lead
to a codification of the Urf laws. Special attention should be given to procedure and law
in the capitals, for there would the system crystallize and the law assume finality.
The sharp separation of the judicial from the executive function would also do much
to purify justice.
As regards finance, the Minister of Justice would, like all other Ministers, be
responsible for the preparation of the Estimates and expenditure in his own Department,
and the regular rendering of his accounts to the audit of the Finance Minister to the
scrutiny of the Board of Accounts of the Council of State.
No. 7 .—Provincial Administration.
Having now dealt with the Central Departments, I come to the question of the Present view of
provinces. administration.
Firstly, I must refer back to Part I, Paper No. 1, where a brief sketch was given of
the method of government and the system of taxation and revenue, the evils resulting from
the sale of appointments, the maladministration of the revenues, the manipulation of the
accounts in the interests of the Governors and MustauflSs of the Daftr.
In the preceding papers an endeavour has been made to show how many of these
evils can be minimized ; how the Ministers, through the agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. of a permanent staff, can be
brought into closer union with the provinces, and what an enormous effect this will have
on systematic administration ; how the accounts would assume a healthier tone through
the restriction of the power of the Mustauffi class, and the introduction of a comprehensive
control by the Minister of Finance in the first instance, by the Board of Accounts of the
Council in the second.
There remain now two chief questions as far as the provinces are concerned : one, the
status of the Governors ; the other, the great question of the revenue.
Hitherto the Governor has taken his position in the provinces as the private farmer Present view of
of the estates of the King, not as his responsible Representative in the true meaning of position of Govemoras
■ r J in the province*.
the word.
He has purchased his right to exploit the people, and the Central Government has
always felt that it had no power to criticize his methods, or to interfere except in very
exceptional and scandalous circumstances.
The appointment of permanent agents to responsible positions, and the consequent
displacement of the Governors’ own servants, at once alters the status of the Governor,