'Mesopotamia Administration Committee. Note by Sir James Meston, KCSI, on the future system of government at Baghdad.' [‎143v] (2/2)

2
tenet is applicable to the future of the shrines near Baghdad,
briefly be thus explained.
It may
of the Holy Places is contingent on their being in the
custody oTaMahomedan authority or Power competent to protect them
cu . I • Their guardian ‘ would in time become, I fancy, the
IToTcio Caliph and if he is unable (whether as Caliph or otherwise) to
defend them by the sword of Islam alone, his failure will ipso facto mean
the appearance of the last Imam, chaos, forcible conversion of the whole
earth to Mahomedanism-in brief, what we should call the end of the world.
I t is thus unthinkable to the Mahometan mind that the impotence of Moslem
"•uardianship should be confessed by the establishment of a Christian
protectorate or suzerainty over either the Hedjaz or the Shiah shrines in
\Vhat™vould happen in practice if Great Britain and its Allies did decide
on such a protectorate, I cannot pretend to prophecy. The end of the world
probably would not come ; but among our Moslem population an unrest an
resentment would be engendered which no prudent Government would
provoke except under very grave necessity. An extra-friendly Mahomed an
here and there would be glad at heart to see the shrines under honest and
capable supervision such as we could ensure ; an acquaintance of mine
actually dared to say so in a pamphlet which he wrote on the entrance of
Turkey into the war; but he was met with a storm of obloquy, and it is
clear that the Mahomedan world generally would not tolerate the suggestion.
I have just happened upon a strong corroboration of this view in a quotation
from an address by the late Lord Cromer. While expressing some delicacy
in giving a definite opinion on a purely theological issue, he wrote:
“ It is held that the due exercise of the spiritual power cannot be ensured
unless the Khalif is placed in a position of assured political
independence. Hence, although possibly the substitution of some
Khalif other than the Sultan of Turkey might be effected without
any great shock to Moslem opinion and sentiment, the recognition
of a Khalif who could directly or indirectly be brought under non-
Moslem influences would be strongly resented.”
In a matter of this sort it is easier to be critical than suggestive. It is
possible, however, that the King of the lledjaz may provide a way out.
The Crown of Arabia might be acknowdedged in the treaties of peace as an
independent Power, and given the ultimate sovereignty of Baghdad, subject
to any terms on which the British Government and the Sharif may separately
agree as to the actual form of administration. Many who know Arabia
doubt whether the new r kingdom will hold together for more than a few
years, but it could be made to serve our purpose for the time, and the
problems arising from its disintegration will come on us when we have
more leisure to deal with them. For the moment, what I wish to suggest
is that the assertion of any form of control, protection or suzerainty by
Great Britain or her Allies over the Holy LMahomedan) Places near Baghdad
should be postponed until Moslem feeling is ascertained.
.1 AS Mk.STMV
21st May 1917.