'Memorandum on the Drafts of Despatches regarding the Affairs of Muscat and Zanzibar' [‎30r] (9/24)

9
Under the most favourable circumstances, it is
now impossible for the Resident in the Gulf to get
an answer from India under six weeks, and four
months would, I believe, be more nearly the average.
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. politics are not likely to be familiar
to Indian statesmen, unless they have been espe
cially studied, and a Viceroy is peculiarly ill-situated
for obtaining information relating to naval matters
when at Simla, where he can only by the merest
accident meet any one who has any practical know
ledge of or interest in naval affairs or commerce,
especially in the Seas of Western India. In all
these respects, the Secretary of State in London is
infinitely better off than any Viceroy can be at
Simla. Even Bombay is inconveniently distant for
controlling the Resident, unless he fully understands
what the Government intend and wish, and enjoys
their entire confidence, so that he can act promptly
on a known policy, without waiting for orders; and
I feel convinced that any attempt to substitute a
system of minute report and reference for instruc
tions from Calcutta or Simla, before action, must
end in perpetual blunders and failures.
The Resident should continue to be a trusted
and intelligent representative, not a clerk in leading
strings. Any attempt to put him in the latter
position will lead to failures and cross purposes,
numerous and serious in proportion to the length
of the leading strings. The evil will be greater if
it is attempted to pull the strings from Bombay,
and greater still if from Calcutta or Simla.
The consequences of the present system are worse
than complete paralysis of all useful action. Abso
lute inaction in dealing with a semi-civilized, igno
rant, and fanatical people is often dangerous, but
action on such people, through a mistrusted agent,
directed four months after the events contemplated,
by a distant and ill-informed absolute Government,
is* worse than mischievous; it is ridiculous, and
almost certain to produce results the opposite of
what was intended.
In the present case, with the best intentions of
not interfering in the internal affairs of Muscat, we
have thrice, in two years, turned the scale, and
always in the direction opposite to that which our
interests, our obligations, and our intentions indi
cated. We have recognized and bolstered up a
parricide, actively checked his relations who would
have deposed him; we have made one uncle a
prisoner and deported him, and threatened another
with blockade, if he exercised his undoubted rights,
as an independent sovereign, to punish his nephew ;
and, finally, we have supplied our parricidal protege
with funds to break up a confederacy of the tribes
of Oman, who had risen in rebellion to depose
him. It is true we did not contemplate any of
these results, but they have all been produced by
our agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. and influence, in spite of our intentions.
The circumstances which led to my letter of the
23d of March 1866 were briefly these :—
The Wahabees, and pirate tribes instigated by
9638 b . C